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This dissertation aims to investigate whether firms have a greater predisposition to 
conduct domestic rather than international merger and acquisition (M&A) deals (home 
bias), distinguishing state owned enterprises (SOEs) from privately owned enterprises 
(POEs) and acquirers originating in developed economies from those originating in 
emerging and developing economies. Financial theory predicts no existence of home bias 
in M&As because well diversified investments can reduce risk significantly without 
affecting expected return. However, empirical studies conclude that firms are only 
partially diversified internationally (i.e. argue in favour of the existence of home bias) 
mostly due to geographical and asymmetric information aspects. Making use of data 
(from Dealogic database) on worldwide M&A deals between 1996 and 2013, we test 
three hypotheses: 1) there is a home bias in M&A deals; 2) SOEs tend to have greater 
home bias in their M&A activity than POEs; and 3) firms originating in developed 
economies tend to have a greater home bias in their M&A activity than those from 
emerging and developing economies. The hypothesis 1 is tested using binomial 
probability tests and hypotheses 2 and 3 through probit regressions. The results are clear: 
there is a home bias in M&As, i.e. firms have a greater propensity to undertake domestic 
than cross-border M&As (it is a fact for the period between 1996 and 2013 as a whole 
and for all the years under review individually). Moreover, contrary to what we were 
expecting, we find a strong evidence that: i) SOEs tend to have a lower home bias in their 
M&A activity than POEs; and ii) firms located in emerging and developing economies 
tend to have a greater home bias in their M&A activity than firms located in developed 
economies. As there is a very limited knowledge about home bias in M&As and how it 
depends on the type of acquirer and on its home country, this dissertation constitutes a 
very important contribution to the literature on M&As. 
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 Esta dissertação tem como objetivo investigar se as empresas têm uma maior 
predisposição para realizar fusões e aquisições (M&As) no mercado doméstico do que no 
exterior (home bias), distinguindo empresas públicas (SOEs) de empresas privadas 
(POEs) e empresas localizadas em economias desenvolvidas das localizadas em 
economias emergentes e em desenvolvimento. A teoria financeira prevê a inexistência de 
um home bias em M&As dado que investimentos diversificados podem reduzir 
significativamente o risco sem afetar o retorno esperado. No entanto, estudos empíricos 
concluem que as empresas estão apenas parcialmente diversificadas internacionalmente 
(i.e. argumentam a favor da existência de home bias) devido principalmente a aspetos 
geográficos e de assimetria de informação. Utilizando os dados (da base de dados 
Dealogic) sobre M&As realizadas em todo o mundo entre 1996 e 2013, testamos três 
hipóteses: 1) existe um home bias em M&As; 2) as SOEs tendem a ter um maior home 
bias em M&As do que as POEs; e 3) as empresas localizadas em economias 
desenvolvidas tendem a ter um maior home bias em M&As do que as localizadas em 
economias emergentes e em desenvolvimento. A hipótese 1 é testada utilizando testes de 
probabilidade binomial e as hipóteses 2 e 3 através de regressões probit. Os resultados 
são claros: existe um home bias em M&As, ou seja, as empresas têm uma maior 
propensão para realizar M&As no mercado doméstico do que no exterior (é um facto para 
o período entre 1996 e 2013 como um todo e para todos os anos em análise 
individualmente). Além disso, contrariamente ao esperado, encontramos uma forte 
evidência de que: i) as SOEs tendem a ter um menor home bias na atividade de M&A do 
que as POEs; e ii) as empresas localizadas em economias emergentes e em 
desenvolvimento tendem a ter um maior home bias na atividade de M&A do que as 
empresas localizadas em economias desenvolvidas. Dado que existe um conhecimento 
muito limitado sobre home bias em M&As e de como ele depende do tipo de adquirente 
e do país de origem, esta dissertação constitui um contributo muito importante para a 
literatura sobre M&As. 
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Palavras-Chave: Home Bias; Fusões e Aquisições (M&As); Investimento Direto 
Estrangeiro; Empresas Públicas; Empresas Privadas; Economias Desenvolvidas; 
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Global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows increased considerably over the last 
years, with a total growth of 271% and an average yearly growth of 8% between 1996 
and 20131 (calculations based on UNCTAD, 2014). Moreover, these flows grew, in the 
same period, at a much faster yearly pace than worldwide Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(5.3%) and international trade (5.5%) (IMF, 2014). According to UNCTAD (2014), 
international mergers and acquisitions (IM&As) have been of critical relevance, 
representing almost 40% of the total FDI flows between 1996 and 2013. A key economic 
player, notably in recent years, has been the public sector – through state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) – both in developed and emerging economies (Sauvant and Strauss, 
2012).  
This dissertation aims to investigate whether SOEs and privately owned enterprises 
(POEs) have greater predisposition to conduct domestic than cross-border deals (i.e. have 
greater home bias), measured by the share of domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
in total M&A deals. In other words, the main research question that this dissertation aims 
ultimately to answer is: “Is there a home bias in M&A deals?”. Two complementary 
research questions are also addressed, notably: “Is the home bias more predominant in 
M&As made by SOEs or in M&As made by POEs?” and “How does home bias in M&As 
differ between acquirers originating in developed economies and those from emerging 
and developing economies?”. 
Until now, as far as we are aware, this kind of research – focused specifically on 
home bias in M&As, distinguishing SOEs from POEs and firms located in developed 
economies from those located in developing and emerging economies – has never been 
done. Thus, we contribute to the literature by treating a novel angle of research, analyzing 
a large number of countries (extant literature usually focuses on a specific economy/ 
limited group of countries) and a large sample period (former studies typically use a small 
number of years). In order to do that we  (1) conduct a rigorous literature review on home 
bias, highlighting differences (or similarities) between M&A deals made by SOEs vs. 
POEs, emerging/developing economies vs. developed economies; (2) develop hypotheses 
                                                     
1 The figures refer to Foreign Direct Investment inflows, i.e. the value of inward direct investment made by 




allowing to test the chosen research questions; (3) conduct a descriptive analysis of the 
general patterns on M&A activity; (4) test the posited hypotheses through binomial 
probability tests and appropriate econometric models; and (5) discuss the results obtained, 
in the light of other studies analyzed in the literature review. 
The empirical study is based on data extracted from Dealogic2, a database on M&As 
including both domestic and international deals. The sample period is 18 full years (1996-
2013), and includes over 200,000 observations. In addition, we also make use of data 
from UNCTAD (UNCTAD, 2015) and OECD (OECD, 2000). 
The dissertation is structured in the following way. After this introduction, a 
literature review is developed, highlighting key concepts and the main existent 
contributions on home bias in M&As. Subsequently, the empirical research methodology 
and the dataset are explained. The section after reports the empirical results and their 
discussion. Lastly, we present the conclusions and issues for future research.   
  
                                                     




2. Literature review 
 
This chapter aims to address some of the most important concepts, theories and 
literature on home bias in M&As.  
Firstly, the key concepts of this study are explained. Following that, we present the 
main theories on internationalization through IM&As (industrial organization literature 
and international business theories). Lastly, a literature review on home bias in M&As is 
developed, distinguishing SOEs from POEs and firms originating in developed 
economies from those located in emerging and developing economies.  
 
 
2.1. Key concepts 
 
Before analyzing the extant literature on home bias in M&As (and how it ranges 
between SOEs and POEs and between firms located in developed economies and firms 
originating in emerging and developing economies), it is crucial to clarify the concepts 
of the underlying assumptions and approaches raised throughout this study. As such, we 
provide a definition of foreign direct investment, state owned enterprise, mergers and 
acquisitions and developed economies vs. emerging and developing economies. 
 
 
Defining foreign direct investment 
 According to UNCTAD (2009), FDI is an “investment involving a long-term 
relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity in one 
economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an 
economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate 
enterprise or foreign affiliate)” (UNCTAD, 2009, p. 243). The lasting interest is achieved 
when the foreign direct investor owns 10% or more of the voting power of the FDI 
enterprise (OECD, 2008).   
In addition, it is important to note that FDI and IM&As are different concepts. In a 
nutshell, IM&As are one of the modes of establishment via which FDI may occur (the 
other being greenfield investment) (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Between 1996 and 





Defining state owned enterprise 
The literature is not unanimous in what concerns the definition of SOE. Sauvant 
and Strauss (2012) define SOEs as firms in which the government has a controlling 
interest defined as a stake of 10% or more of the voting power, while Kowalski, Büge, 
Sztagerowska and Egeland (2012) define as firms in which the government has a stake of 
50% or more of the voting power. There are studies and databases that use a more 
restrictive definition of SOE (e.g. Dealogic database) imposing 100% government 
ownership. The dissertation will adopt this more restrictive, yet unequivocal, last 
definition, as that is the one used in the large-scale dataset available, and that we employ 
in our estimations.   
 
Defining mergers and acquisitions 
Mergers and acquisitions are two different concepts that should be distinguished. A 
merger is a combination of two (or more) firms, in order to “share resources” and reach 
“common objectives” (OECD, 2008, p.198). On the other hand, an acquisition is the 
purchase of existing shares issued by another firm for increasing ownership or control 
level by the acquiring firm. There are two types of acquisitions: take-over (the acquirer is 
larger than the target firm) and reverse take-over (the target firm is larger than the 
acquirer) (OECD, 2008). An international merger and acquisition (IM&A) occurs when 
the acquirer and the target are firms based in two different national jurisdictions.  
 
Defining developed economies and emerging/ developing economies 
The designation of developed and emerging/ developing economies is not obvious 
as there are several approaches usually derived from statistical standards (UNSTATS, 
2015)3. Below, we present an overview of the United Nations’, World Bank’s and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s country classification system. 
The United Nations Development Programme’s Country Classification System 
depends on the Human Development Index that is built taking into account the longevity 
(life expectancy at birth), education (actual and expected years of schooling) and income 
                                                     
3 According to the United Nations Statistics Division, “the designations ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ are 
intended for statistical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgment about the stage reached by 
a particular country or area in the development process” (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49.htm, 




(Gross National Income per capita). Developed economies are countries in the top quartile 
in the Human Developed Index; all others are designated as developing economies 
(Nielsen, 2011). In turn, the World Bank’s Country Classification System is based on 
criteria relating to poverty incidence, infant mortality and economic variables such as 
Gross National Income per capita (Nielsen, 2011). Lastly, according to the IMF (IMF, 
2015), the designation depends on the per capita income, export diversification and on 
the degree of integration into the global financial system4. 
For the empirical study included in this dissertation, we decided to use the 
information provided by the IMF as it is the only one among the three sources identified 
above that explicitly identifies which economies are developed vs. emerging and 
developing. The World Economic Outlook report published in April 2015 (IMF, 2015) 
makes use of data from 189 economies, classifying 37 as developed economies and the 
remaining 152 as emerging/ developing economies5. As the IMF does not consider (and 
does not classify) all countries in the world (and all countries in Dealogic database), other 
sources were used as well, including the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSTATS, 
2015a)6. 
 
2.2. Theoretical background 
 
The theories on internationalization through IM&As span the areas of industrial 
organization and international business (covered in this section). On home bias 
specifically, it is useful also to draw theoretical insights from financial theory (to be 
explained in section 2.3.). Below, we clarify the theoretical background to this 
dissertation, and how it relates to home bias. 
 
2.2.1. Industrial organization 
 Industrial organization (IO) literature usually does not address explicitly IM&As, 
as most IO studies investigate domestic M&As across different industries (Brakman, 
                                                     
4 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/faq.htm, accessed on August 31st, 2015. 
5 The appendix 2 contains the list of countries considered by the IMF as well as its classification.  




Garretsen, Marrewijk and Witteloostuijn, 2013). According to Brakman et al. (2013) 
domestic M&As may occur due to efficiency or strategic motives, i.e. to increase scale 
and scope economies or change the market structure, respectively.  
 Nevertheless, IO literature argues that firms’ internationalization (e.g. through 
cross-border M&As) is related to the level of competition within the industry in which 
they operate. Hence, when the level of competition is high, firms tend to conduct FDI 
projects to obtain new profitable opportunities (Hymer, 1976 and Boter and Holmquist, 
1996, as mentioned by Wang, Hong, Kafouros, and Boateng, 2012). Thus, different 
industries may have different internationalization potential. For example, it is expected 
that sectors which produce standardized products or services as well as high technology 
industries have more pronounced FDI flows, i.e. have a lower home bias (Wang et al., 
2012). Sometimes, FDI is also the result of legal and regulatory issues, i.e. firms conduct 
IM&As because they have no permission to increase the market share in their country 
(Brakman et al., 2013). 
 
2.2.2. International business theories 
 According to international business theories, internationalization can be explained 
(in the aspects we are concerned about) by theories/frameworks such as the Uppsala 
model, the OLI framework (also known as the eclectic paradigm), oligopolistic 
interaction theory, and the resource-based view. In addition, the motivations for FDI 
developed by Dunning and Lundan (2008) are also addressed.  
 
 Uppsala model 
According to the Uppsala model (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977), the internationalization of a firm is in most cases not immediate, and 
tends to occur after its development in the domestic market (initial home focus), as this 
process requires the accumulation of resources and knowledge about the host country 
(e.g. language, business practices, culture, level of industrial development and education, 
political systems, etc). At the cornerstone of this model is the concept of “psychic 
distance”, that means all the factors that disturb the information channel between the firm 




Moreover, as shown in figure 1 below, the internationalization process usually 
follows some stages, notably: (i) no regular export activities (the firm does not have any 
regular information channel); (ii) export via independent representatives (the firm has a 
regular information channel to the market which allow it knows the influencing factors); 
(iii) sales subsidiary (the firm has more control over the market information, i.e. it has the 
ability to select the information that comes from the market to the firm) and, if applicable 
(iv) production subsidiary (the firm has a larger resource commitment).  
Figure 1: Internationalization process (Uppsala model) 
 
 
So, according to the Uppsala model: (1) there is an initial home bias that is mitigated 
and eventually disappears over time; and (2) firms tend to conduct international deals in 
countries with similar characteristics to their own, at least at an early stage of the 
internationalization process.  
 
 The eclectic paradigm 
 The eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977), also called the OLI framework, states that 
FDI only occurs when firms have simultaneously three types of advantages: ownership 
(O), location (L) and internalization (I) advantages. Ownership advantages7 refer to 
competitive advantages a firm may have over other firms in the host country, and can 
result from asset-based ownership advantages or transaction-based ownership advantages 
(Dunning, 1977). The first encompass technological capabilities, human skills and 
competence, privileged access to markets and financial and marketing capabilities; the 
latter refer to advantages arising from the very multinationality and international 
                                                     
7 The concept of ownership advantage proposed by Dunning is reminiscent of the concept of advantage 
advanced by Hymer (1976). Hymer (1976) states that there are costs of operating abroad (e.g. related to the 
knowledge of the market, communication) and defends that FDI only occurs if firms possess some specific 
advantages that outweigh the relative costs of foreign production. Firm-specific advantages usually derive 
from intangible assets (e.g. technology, business techniques and skilled personnel), for which international 















experience of the firm, and are related to economies of scale and scope, the size of the 
firm, risk diversification and arbitrage among markets (see Caves, 1974; Saunders, 1982). 
Location advantages denote advantages related to the location of the host country by 
comparison with the home country, in terms of a multiplicity of factors such as lower 
costs and abundance of natural and other resources, and legal, political, cultural and 
institutional features, among other aspects. In turn, internalization advantages exist when 
firms are more efficient than markets in the organization of the international economic 
activity, i.e. in markets where price is not easily determined (e.g. markets where 
knowledge is crucial element; and markets for intermediate goods where the stability of 
supply is critical for the firm’s survival) (see Buckley and Casson, 1976).  
 Thus, according to the eclectic paradigm, the home bias tends to be less significant 
for firms that face ownership, location and internalization advantages simultaneously, 
such as those operating in technologically-intensive industries, which produce 
intermediate goods and whose knowledge is a crucial input.   
 
 Oligopolistic interaction theory 
 Oligopolistic interaction/ reaction theory (Knickerbocker, 1973; Graham, 1975; 
Flowers, 1976) tries to understand why FDI tends to agglomerate geographically and 
sectorally. FDI can be explained by the strategic behaviour of firms in oligopolistic 
markets. Firms create barriers in new markets, take advantage of scale and scope 
economies and follow competitors’ internationalization process to inhibit them gaining 
strategic advantage. Hence, this theory predicts no existence of home bias if competitors 
also invest abroad. 
 
 Resource-based view 
 The resource-based view was developed notably by Penrose (1959) and Barney 
(1991). These authors investigated how resources influence the direction of expansion of 
a firm.  
 Penrose (1959) argues that firms’ economic value derives from the possession of 
resources and its effective and innovative management. In other words, growth 
opportunities and the innovation of a firm depend on its resources as well as how they are 




slack (i.e. the unusual resource) identified as one of the determinant factors of firms’ 
growth. According to Penrose (1959, p. 68), “unused productive services available from 
existing resources are a ‘waste’ (…) but they are ‘free’ services which, if they can be used 
profitably, may provide a competitive advantage for the firm possessing them”. Given 
this, it is expected that firms with a greater managerial slack tend to have a greater 
propensity to invest abroad through IM&As and then a lower home bias in M&A activity.  
 In turn, Barney (1991) also studied the source of sustained competitive advantage8 
and concluded that it derives from the heterogeneity and imperfect mobility of resources 
between firms. It is argued that firms cannot obtain sustained competitive advantages 
when strategic resources are perfectly mobile and equally distributed across all 
competitors. Thus, resources must be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and without 
strategic substitutes to generate long-term advantages (Barney, 1991). Given this, it is 
expected that IM&As are encouraged by strategic resource seeking as it is the determinant 
of sustained competitive advantages.    
  
  Motivations for FDI 
 Another conceptual contribution is provided by Dunning and Lundan (2008), who 
propose a typology that identifies four motivations for FDI: (i) resource seeking; (ii) 
market seeking; (iii) efficiency seeking; and (iv) strategic asset seeking.  
(i) Resource seeking: firms try to acquire resources (e.g. raw materials) at a 
cheaper price or not available in the country of origin.  
(ii) Market seeking: FDI with the objective to explore new markets, avoid export 
barriers, and follow the internationalization process of important clients. 
(iii) Efficiency seeking: firms can obtain gains from the common governance of 
geographically distant activities. These gains are related to the reduction in 
communication and coordination costs, scale and scope economies, risk 
diversification, among others. 
(iv) Strategic asset seeking: FDI in order to acquire sophisticated 
resources/competencies not available in the country of origin.    
                                                     
8 Bernay (1991) stated that sustained competitive advantage occurs “when a firm is implementing value 




2.3. Literature review on home bias 
 
The present section addresses the most relevant literature on home bias in M&As. 
It is divided into three parts – home bias in M&As: the puzzle and the reason; home bias 
in M&As by SOEs vs. POEs; and home bias in M&As by firms located in developed 
economies vs. emerging and developing economies. At the end of each of the parts, we 
posit a hypothesis which allows to answer the research questions stated before in this 
dissertation. As most of the studies referenced are empirical, at the end of the section we 
present a table with a summary of the most relevant studies.   
 
2.3.1. Home bias in M&As: the puzzle and the reasons  
Financial theory predicts no home bias in investments because, according to a 
portfolio standpoint, well diversified investments – acquisition of geographically and 
culturally distant foreign assets – can reduce risk significantly without affecting expected 
return (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). In other words, more internationalized firms 
provide greater diversification benefits to investors.  However, firms are only partially 
diversified internationally, i.e. they are less internationalized than what financial theory 
predicts. This is called the “home bias puzzle” or “international diversification puzzle” 
(Eldor, Pines and Schwartz, 1988; De Santis and Gerard, 1997; Coval and Moskowitz, 
1999; Berrill and Kearney, 2010; Cooper, Sercu, and Vanpée, 2012). 
Although such phenomenon appears to be inefficient from a diversification 
perspective, the literature offers a variety of explanations for this behaviour.  Two of them 
are related to geographical and asymmetric information aspects. Firms spatially distant 
face more difficulties in pursuing M&As because the information of the target’s value 
tends to be more imprecise, and monitoring and communicating costs tend to be higher 
(Green, 1990; Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; di Giovanni, 2005; Lehto, 2006). Moreover, 
firms usually merge to share assets in order to increase efficiency and profits, and it is not 
possible for firms spatially distant (Lehto, 2006).  
The propensity to undertake investments in one’s home country also remains strong 




sovereign risk, variation in regulation and culture (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999) and risk 
of expropriation (Eldor, Pines and Schwartz, 1988). 
In addition, there are other reasons that may lead companies to continue investing 
within national boundaries like the corporate tax rate in the host country, exchange rate 
fluctuations (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; di Giovanni, 2005; Berrill and Kearney, 2010) 
as well as financing constraints (insufficient internal funds and debt capacity), which 
manifest themselves more in IM&As than in domestic M&As (Chen, Huang and Chen, 
2009). Berril and Kearney (2010) also argue that firms can diversify their portfolio by 
investing in home-based domestic firms with foreign assets. In other words, firms can 
gain international diversification and exposure without having to invest abroad. 
Although the empirical literature argues in favour of the existence of a home bias 
(“home bias puzzle”) contrary to what would be expected according to financial theory, 
there are some factors (besides the risk diversification perspective) that increase the 
likelihood of internationalization through IM&As. Firms that invest in research and 
development, have highly educated staff and have export experience (Lehto, 2006) as 
well as firms with higher productivity, higher goodwill relative to total assets and higher 
Herfindahl index (proxy for ownership concentration) (Kling and Weitzel, 2011) have 
increased occurrence of international deals.  
Di Giovanni (2005) also studied the effect of financial variables and institutional 
factors and concluded that the size of financial markets, measured by stock market 
capitalization to GDP ratio, plays a significant role in the occurrence of IM&As. In 
addition, investment costs tend to decrease (i) with the liberalization of trade and 
investment regimes and the deregulation of services (through trade/service agreements 
and economic integration) as well as (ii) if firms’ countries have a common language, 
which may signal a better monitoring and communicating capacity to internalize the 
synergies of cross-border M&As (Chen and Findlay, 2003; di Giovanni, 2005).  
The legal environment and the financial development in the host country are also 
important aspects for firms’ internationalization decisions. As governments relax their 
cross-border M&A laws and the domestic credit (as a percentage of GDP) increases, the 
number of foreign bidders tends to rise, i.e. the home bias in M&As would decrease 




Globerman and Shapiro (2002) studied the role of governance infrastructure on FDI 
flows and found that policies promoting competition at both domestic and international 
levels, as well as open and transparent legal and regulatory regimes are key determinants 
of international deals. Rossi and Volpin (2004) also stressed the relevance of stronger 
shareholder protection and better accounting standards to increase IM&A activity. As 
shareholder protection in the home country rises, the likelihood of an all-cash M&A 
decreases, allowing leveraged firms to conduct international deals. 
Finally, investment promotion activities also arise as important drivers for firms’ 
internationalization through IM&As, mainly in countries in which information 
asymmetries and red tape are relatively more significant (e.g. developing economies) 
(Harding and Javorcik, 2011). These activities involve “advertising, investment seminars 
and missions, participation in trade shows and exhibitions, distribution of literature, one-
to-one direct marketing efforts, facilitating visits of prospective investors, matching 
prospective investors with local partners, help with obtaining permits and approvals, 
preparing project proposals, conducting feasibility studies and servicing investors whose 
projects have already become operational” (Wells and Wint, 2000, cited in Harding and 
Javorcik, 2011, p. 1450).  
Based on this literature, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a home bias in M&A deals. 
 
2.3.2. Home bias in M&As by SOEs vs. POEs 
In what concerns SOEs and POEs, Chen et al. (2009) state that SOEs have less 
incentives to participate as acquirers in cross-border M&A activities than POEs. SOEs 
seem to face fewer financing constraints when compared to POEs, but they are averse to 
transfer abroad (part of) their management control and thus prefer domestic M&As. 
SOEs’ investments are often limited by regulations and its managers do not have complete 
control over those decisions (Chen et al., 2009).   
Kling and Weitzel (2011), who investigated M&As closed by Chinese firms, 
concluded that most IM&As by SOEs are conducted to restructure the firm and not to 
acquire strategic foreign assets due to the political opposition in the host country. While 




political and economic conditions, SOEs conduct more deals in natural resource sectors 
following the strategic needs of their home country and are not so averse to the economic 
and political risks in the host countries (Amighini, Rabellotti and Sanfilippo, 2013). Nutt 
(2000) and Cui and Jiang (2012) also found that SOEs are highly dependent on home 
country institutions due to the political affiliation with the home country government, 
making decisions largely based on social welfare, decreasing the likelihood to undertake 
IM&As. 
However, other studies (for instance, Luo and Tung, 2007; Sutherland and Ning, 
2011; Duanmu, 2012; and Wei, Zheng, Liu and Lu, 2014), concluded that home bias is 
lower in M&As by SOEs because they possess better access to resources (e.g. through 
their business affiliates or banks) and respond to political risks in the host country less 
negatively, increasing the likelihood of internationalization. SOEs can obtain external 
capital from state-controlled financial institutions and from their governments. In 
addition, SOEs are also more likely to invest abroad compared to POEs as a consequence 
of the appreciation of the home country’s currency because they have an easier access to 
capital and foreign reserves granted by the government (Duanmu, 2012).  
In turn, POEs tend to invest overseas mainly to support their trade activities (to 
respond to unfavourable domestic environments), to access global production networks, 
or to raise capital (Luo and Tung, 2007; Sutherland and Ning, 2011).   
Based on this literature, on balance, we consider that POEs have a greater 
predisposition to conduct IM&A deals than SOEs. Thus, we derive the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: SOEs tend to have greater home bias in their M&A activity than 
POEs.  
 
2.3.3. Home bias in M&As by firms located in developed economies vs. emerging 
and developing economies 
As far as we are aware, the kind of research focused specifically on this has never 
been done. However, former studies (for instance, Rossi and Volpin, 2004 and Moskalev, 
2010) have found that firms located in countries whose real GDP per capita is low but its 




wealthy but faster growing economies have become more internationalized through 
IM&As. This can be seen as an indicator that home bias is less significant for firms 
located in emerging/ developing economies.   
Moreover, Kowalski et al. (2012), who investigate the internationalization of SOEs, 
concluded that SOEs in OECD countries9 tend to be relatively more domestically oriented 
than in emerging economies (BRIICS countries10), i.e. considering only SOEs, the home 
bias is higher in developed than in emerging economies. Indeed, governments from 
emerging economies have supported outward FDI through financial and fiscal measures 
(e.g. fast approval process and low lending rates), development assistance programs, risk 
management (protection through insurance products and services), the provision of 
information on opportunities in other countries, and international investment agreements 
(Sauvant and Chen, 2014).  
Analyzing the FDI flows over the last years, we found that, although developed 
economies constitute the main driver of cross-border investments, FDI from developing 
economies has been growing. In 2013, it already represented 32.2% of the total FDI flows 
(UNCTAD, 2014). This can be seen as an indicator that home bias in developing 
economies can decrease.  
Based on this literature, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms originating in developed economies tend to have a greater 
home bias in their M&A activity than those from emerging and developing economies. 
 
In table 1 below, we provide a summary of the most relevant empirical studies 
(referred throughout this section) on M&As addressing the determinant factors of home 




                                                     
9 The current Member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development are: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, and United States (www.oecd.org). 
10 BRIICS is the acronym for an association of six major emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, 

















Explain the home 
bias in M&As by the 
size of financial 
markets 
All deals in the 
world between 
January 1, 1990 




Real gross M&A 
investment flows 
(deflated by the 1996 
US CPI) from 
country j to country i 
at year t 
Stock market capitalization in country j (current US$) (+) 
i) “Financial variables and other 
institutional factors seem to play a 
significant role in M&A flows. In 
particular, the size of financial 
markets, as measured by the stock 
market capitalization to GDP ratio, 
has a strong positive association 
with domestic firms investing 
abroad” p. 127; ii) “The 
importance of investment costs, as 
proxied by distance and more 
directly by bilateral telephone 
traffic, is also affirmed, and the 
estimated coefficients for these 
variables are similar to those found 
in the previous literature on FDI” 
p.145. 
Credit provided to the private sector by banks and near-banks in 
country j (current US$) 
(n.s.) 
The distance between i and j (-) 
Total gross telephone traffic between i and j (+) 
Real goods trade flow from country j to i (+) 
A binary variable equal to 1 if i and j have a common language (+) 
A binary variable equal to 1 if i and j belong to a common customs 
union 
(n.s.) 
A binary variable equal to 1 if i and j belong to a common free 
trade agreement 
(n.s.) 
A binary variable equal to 1 if i and j belong to a common service 
agreement 
(+) 
The average corporate tax rate in country i (-) 
A binary variable equal to 1 if i and j have a capital tax treaty (+) 
Real exchange rate (-) 
Volatility of the bilateral monthly nominal exchange rate changes 
for 5 years prior to t 
(+) 
Log-difference of country i's real GDP per capita and country j's (-) 
Square of the wage (-) 
Lehto (2006) 
Investigate the home 








(dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the M&A 
is cross-border and 0 
if domestic) 
The age of a ﬁrm (n.s.) 
i) “The ﬁrm characteristics of an 
acquiring ﬁrm such as the high 
educational level of the staff, 
which can be regarded as an 
indication of a good monitoring 
capacity or ability to internalize the 
potential synergies of distant 
M&As, increase the probability of 
cross-border M&As at the expense 
of domestic M&As” p. 17; ii)  “A 
ﬁrm’s R&D stock, which may 
signal a good monitoring ability, 
increases the probabilities for 
The company consists of several establishments = 1, otherwise = 
0 
(-) 
The majority share is in foreign ownership = 1, otherwise = 0 (-) 
The ﬁrm has exported = 1, otherwise = 0 (+) 
A log of the turnover of a ﬁrm (+) 
Gross margin divided by the turnover of a ﬁrm (-) 
Short- and long-term debts divided by the total assets of a ﬁrm (-) 
Fixed tangible assets divided by the total assets of a ﬁrm (-) 
The share of highly educated with technical qualiﬁcations of the 
total number of employees in a ﬁrm 
(+) 
The share of highly educated (excluding the number of highly 
educated with technical qualiﬁcations) of the total number of 
employees in a ﬁrm 
(n.s.) 
                                                     
11 The acronym n.s. means that the result is not statistically significant at a significance level less than or equal to 10%. In all other cases, the results are statistically 














A log of [(R&D stock + 1)/turnover].* R&D stock of a company 
that is estimated based on the previous R&D expenditures (see 
Lehto and Lehtoranta 2002) 
(+) 
cross-border or distant domestic 
M&As” p. 17. 
A log of the number of ﬁrms whose turnover is over €0.5 million 
in the same region 
(-) 
Chen et al. 
(2009) 
Investigate the 












1998 to 2005 
Logistic 
Regressions (P-





allow to understand if 
the independent 
variables are, on 
average, higher for 
domestic M&A deals 
or for cross-border 
ones 
Deal characteristics 
Logarithm of the deal size (>IM&As)12 
i) “The extent of stock market and 
governance developments 
improves corporate ﬁnancing 
conditions and subsequently 
encourages cross-border M&As in 
East Asia” p. 665; ii) “The ﬁrm-
speciﬁc factors of ﬁnancing 
constraints reduce the occurrence 
of cross-border M&As relative to 
domestic M&As” p. 665; iii) 
Family- and state-controlled ﬁrms 
prefer domestic M&As to cross-
border deals, because they have 
better access to external ﬁnancing 
and “they are reluctant to risk 
diluting their management control” 
p. 665. 
All cash (dummy variable that equals 1 if 





Logarithm of a ﬁrm’s total assets (n.s.) 
Ratio of cash and equivalents to the total 
assets 
(>IM&As) 
Ratio of debt to total capital (leverage) (>DM&As) 
Market value of assets divided by the book 
value of assets 
(>IM&As) 
Likelihood of financing constraint measured 
by the KZ Index (Lamon et al, 2001) 
(>DM&As) 
Family (dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
state is not the ultimate shareholder and the 
family’s ownership is greater than 20 
percent) 
(n.s.) 
State (dummy that equals 1 if the ultimate 
shareholder is a domestic state entity with 
ownership greater than 10 per cent) 
(>DM&As) 
Cross-List (dummy variable that equals 1 if 




Common Law (dummy that equals 1 if the 
origin of company law is the English 
common law) 
(>IM&As) 
GI(WB) - the proxy of governance index 




Stock Market Depth (ratio of a country’s 
stock market capitalization to its GDP) 
(>IM&As) 
Bond Market Depth (ratio of a country’s 
private domestic debt to its GDP) 
(n.s.) 
Control variables 
AHT (dummy that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is in 
the high-tech industry) 
(>IM&As) 
ROA (return on assets) (n.s.) 
Logarithm of a country’s GDP (>DM&As) 
                                                     
12 (>IM&As) means that the independent variable has a stronger (positive) correlation with the occurrence of IM&As than with the occurrence of domestic M&As 































(dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the M&A 
is cross-border and 0 
if domestic) 
SOEs - dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer is a SOE and 
o if the acquirer is a POE 
(-)  
i) “Chinese cross-border mergers 
create shareholder value, but it is 
lower than domestic expansions” 
p. 357; ii) SOEs predicts fewer 
IM&As; iii) “A favourable board 
structure and corporate 
transparency explains higher M&A 
returns” p. 357; iv) “In more 
mature markets, firm- and 
industry-specific determinants 
affect M&As in China” p. 357. 
Track record of past acquisitions (-) 
Share ownership by the acquirers management (-) 
Firms with high return on equity (+) 
Goodwill relative to total assets (+) 
Herfindahl index (+) 




Independent board members (n.s.) 
Disclosure of top executives' salaries (n.s.) 
Index that quantifies the degree of development of the regional 
legal system, enforcement and intermediary organizations 
(n.s.) 
Size (log of the acquirer’s total assets) (n.s.) 
Leverage (total debt divided by total equity) (n.s.) 
Firms that issue B- or H-shares (n.s.) 




















Considering all firms 
Sales (n.s.) 
i) “SOEs in the sample do not 
differ from private firms with 
regard to their number of domestic 
subsidiaries but their number of 
foreign subsidiaries and as such the 
ratio of foreign over domestic 
subsidiaries is significantly lower 
than for private firms. These 
findings suggest that the SOEs 
among the world's largest 
publically listed companies tend to 
be less internationally oriented 
than their private counterparts” p. 
35; ii) “The SOE coefficients for 
the OECD and BRIICS countries 
indicate that SOEs in the OECD 
countries tend to be relatively more 
domestically oriented than in 
emerging economies” p. 35. 
Profits (n.s.) 
Assets (-) 
Market value (+) 
SOE (dummy variable that equals unity if 
the firm is a SOE and equals zero otherwise) 
(-) 
Considering firms 





Market value (+) 
SOE (dummy variable that equals unity if 
the firm is a SOE and equals zero otherwise) 
(-) 
Considering firms 





Market value (n.s.) 
SOE (dummy variable that equals unity if 
the firm is a SOE and equals zero otherwise) 
(-) 
Considering firms 



















SOE (dummy variable that equals unity if 
the firm is a SOE and equals zero otherwise) 
(-) 
Wei et al. (2014) 
Examine the impact 
of multi-dimensional 
factors on firms' 
decisions about 










(OFDI) - dummy 
variable that equals 1 
if firm i reported 
engaging in OFDI 
Total factor productivity (-) i) The “findings suggest the 
importance of internal factors 
including productivity, 
technological capabilities and 
export experience, industry 
conditions including entry barriers, 
subnational institutions and 
intermediate institutional support” 
p. 365; ii) This study “highlights 
the importance of the subnational 
institutions, including the elements 
of regulatory uncertainty, 
government interference and 
intellectual property protection 
which are key units of analysis for 
firms' outward internationalization 
strategy” p. 365; iii) “It is clear that 
internal resources and capabilities 
are still the backbone for firms 
undertaking OFDI (…)” p. 365. 
Technology-based capability (+) 
Brands (whether the firm owns internationally registered brand 
names) 
(n.s.) 
Entry barriers (-) 
Industry R&D (R&D expenditure of the industry in which firm 
operate 
(n.s.) 
Reduction in regulatory uncertainty (-) 
Intellectual property rights protection (+) 
Reduction in government interference (reduced role of 
government in business) 
(-) 
Institutional support (+) 
Size (+) 
Age (n.s.) 
Firm with at least 10% of their sales to foreign countries whithin 3 
years after their inception 
(+) 
Export experience (+) 
Moskalev 
(2010) 
Investigate the link 
between host country 
laws restricting the 
ability of foreign 
bidders to conduct 
cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions 
(M&As) and the 
dynamics of 
domestic and foreign 




M&As and JVs 












(dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the M&A 
is cross-border and 0 
if domestic) 
Real GDP per capita (-) This study allows to conclude that, 
“as governments, especially 
governments of less wealthy, faster 
growing economies, relax their 
cross-border M&A laws, foreign 
bidders increase the number of 
cross-border M&As. The 
likelihood that foreign bidders 
establish cross-border M&As in 
which they obtain a controlling 
stake in the target is greater in host 
countries with less restrictive 
cross-border M&A laws.” p. 69 
“As host country cross-border 
M&A laws improve, foreign 
bidders are increasingly more 
likely to seek the types of entry 
modes that provide them with 
greater control over their 
investments” p. 48. 
Growth in real GDP per capita (+) 
M&A openness score - this implies that, as cross-border M&A 
laws in host countries become less restrictive, the probability of a 
cross-border M&A deal, relative to all other deals, increases 
(+) 
Labor costs (+) 
Exports plus imports divided by GDP (+) 
Skills of the host country (ratio of skilled labor to the total labor 
force) 
(-) 
Proxy for investor protection (-) 
Host country legal environment (+) 
IGRG composite risk rating from the World Development 
Indicators 
(-) 
Market capitalization of domestic firms as a percentage of GDP (+) 
Domestic credit as a percentage of GDP (it measures host country 
financial development) 
(+) 

















effects of governance 
infrastructure on 
both foreign direct 
investment (FDI) 
inflows 
and outflows. In 
addition, the role of 
other forms of 
infrastructure, 
including human 
capital and the 












i) Natural logarithm 
of foreign direct 
investment inflows 
and ii) Natural 




countries and only 
developing and 
transition economies 




Ln GDP (+,+)13 i) “Governance infrastructure is an 
important determinant of both FDI 
inflows and outflows” p. 1899. For 
most countries, both inflows and 
outflows 
respond positively to good 
governance. In particular, good 
political governance is 
characterized by policies 
promoting competition on 
both a domestic and an 
international level, as well as by 
open and transparent legal and 
regulatory regimes, and effective 
delivery of government services. 
The evidence also suggests that the 
returns to investments in good 
governance (in terms of net FDI 
flows) are greater for developing 
and transition economies” p. 1915; 
ii) “Investments in education are 
likely to attract FDI” but “such 
investments are not associated with 
capital outflows” p. 1915; iii) 
Study's “results also provide some 
support for a claim that initiatives 
to promote environmental 
protection and remediation 
encourage, rather than discourage, 
inward FDI” p. 1915; iv) “Policies 
promoting inward FDI will likely 
indirectly encourage increased 
outward FDI by promoting the 
emergence and growth of 
successful home-country MNCs” 
p. 1915. 
Human Developed Index (n.s., n.s.) 
Education Index (+, +) 
Governance infrastructure index (+, +) 
Regulation index (+, +) 
Environment sustainability index (n.s., n.s.) 
ln*GDP*Governance sustainability index (-, n.s.) 




Ln GDP (+, +) 
Human Developed Index (n.s., n.s.) 
Education Index (n.s., n.s.) 
Governance infrastructure index (n.s., -) 
Regulation index (-, -) 
Environment sustainability index (-, -) 
ln*GDP*Governance sustainability index (+, +) 







the world by 








Volume of M&A 
activity (percentage 
of traded firms that 
are targets of 
Logarithm of the 1995 per capita GNP (which proxies for the 
country's wealth 
(+) 
i) “The volume of M&A activity is 
significantly larger in countries 
with better accounting standards 
and stronger shareholder 
protection” p. 277; ii) “The 
GDP growth (which proxies for the change in economic 
conditions) 
(-) 
Common law (+) 
                                                     















differences in laws 




as of December 
31, 2002, and 







Accounting standards (+) probability of an all-cash bid 
decreases with the level of 
shareholder protection in the 
acquirer country” p. 277; iii) “In 
cross-border deals, targets are 
typically from countries with 
poorer investor protection than 
their acquirers’ countries, 
suggesting that cross-border 
transactions play a governance role 
by improving the degree of 
investor protection within target 
firms” p. 277. 
Shareholder protection (+) 
Ownership concentration (+) 
Mandatory bid rule (n.s.) 
Market return (n.s.) 
Hostile takeover, or 
attempted hostile 
takeovers as a 
percentage of traded 
firms 
Market dominance (n.s.) 
Logarithm of the 1995 per capita GNP (which proxies for the 
country's wealth) 
(+) 
GDP growth (which proxies for the change in economic 
conditions) 
(n.s.) 
Common law (+) 
Accounting standards (+) 
Shareholder protection (+) 
Ownership concentration (n.s.) 
Cross-border regulation (-) 
Market return (n.s.) 
Mandatory bid rule (n.s.) 
Cross-border ratio, or 
cross-border deals as 
a percentage of all 
completed deals 
Logarithm of the 1995 per capita GNP (which proxies for the 
country's wealth) 
(-) 
GDP growth (which proxies for the change in economic 
conditions) 
(n.s.) 
Common law (-) 
Accounting standards (-) 
Shareholder protection (-) 
Ownership concentration (n.s.) 
Cross-border regulation (n.s.) 
Market return (n.s.) 
Openness (+) 
Governance motive 
in cross-border M&A 
(number of cross-
border deals where 
the target is from 
country s and the 
acquirer from 
country b, as a 
percentage of the 
total number of deals 
in country's) 
Dif in accounting standards (+) 
Dif in shareholder protection (+) 
Dif(log(GNP per capita)) (+) 
Same language (+) 
Same geographical area (+) 
Dif in market return (n.s.) 
Bilateral trade (+) 
Natural logarithm of 
premium, or the bid 
price as a percentage 
Shareholder protection (+) 















of the closing price of 
the target four weeks 
before the 
announcement 
Hostile bid (n.s.) 
Tender offer (+) 
Contested bid (+) 
Dif shareholder protection (n.s.) 
Bidder M/B (n.s.) 
Mandatory bid rule (-) 
US target (+) 
UK target (+) 
Means of payment 
(dummy variable that 
equals one if the 
acquisition is entirely 
paid in cash, and 
zero, otherwise) 
Shareholder protection (-) 
Target size (-) 
Cross-border (+) 
Hostile bid (+) 
Tender offer (+) 
Contested bid (n.s.) 
Dif shareholder protection (-) 
Bidder M/B (n.s.) 
Mandatory bid rule (n.s.) 
US target (n.s.) 









3. Empirical Investigation  
 
To answer the research questions – “Is there a home bias in M&A deals?”, “Is the 
home bias more predominant in M&As made by SOEs or in M&As made by POEs?” and 
“How does home bias in M&As differ between acquirers originating in developed 
economies and those from emerging/ developing economies?” – we undertook a 
quantitative approach, i.e. starting by conducting an exploratory statistical analysis of the 
general patterns on M&A activity (including an analysis by sector and the home bias 
topic) and subsequently developing an econometric study and performing binomial 
probability tests as well. Below, we explain the dataset specifically assembled for the 






For this empirical methodology, we make use of data available in Dealogic – a 
leading comprehensive database (licensed by the OECD) on M&As.  Data on all M&As 
closed since January 1st, 1996 until December 31st, 2013 were extracted, including both 
domestic (i.e. where the acquirer and the target are based in the same country) and 
international deals (IM&As, i.e. where the acquirer and the target are based in different 
national jurisdictions). 
In order to ensure a rigorous analysis, several transformations to the database were 
undertaken. It was decided to consider a minimum threshold for the deal value. In the 
original dataset, there were numerous cases without deal value and a considerable number 
of transactions were of quite low value, which would be insignificant for the objectives 
of this research. The selected dataset includes only deals with a value equal or superior to 
$5 million14. This threshold means that the dataset covers a wide range of observations in 
terms of deal value, from small value transactions (by international standards) to a 
considerable number of mega-deals. The present dataset includes an impressive total 
                                                     




number of 206,140 M&A deals with values per deal ranging from $5 million to $172 
billion15. The average value of a deal in the dataset is $241 million and the total value of 
the deals included in this dataset is $49.7 trillion.  
Moreover, in addition to Dealogic data (mainly of financial nature), it was decided 
to make use of data assembled by UNCTAD and OECD as well. From UNCTAD we 
used the information on Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) available on the website 
(UNSTAT, 2015a) and from the OECD we make use of data on tax havens (OECD, 
2000).  
Finally, as Dealogic does not provide any information on countries’ classification 
– as developed economies vs. emerging and developing economies (a key variable in this 
dissertation) – we had to take into account other sources. In appendix 1, we explain in 
detail how we classified all countries in Dealogic. 
 
 
3.2. Data treatment methodologies 
 
In order to answer the research questions two main data treatment methodologies 
were used (with a general-to-particular logical sequence): 
1) Descriptive analysis: based on syntheses using descriptive statistics to aggregate 
and organize the data (e.g. means, percentages) – this method is used to analyze 
in depth the general patterns on M&A activity as well as the home bias issue 
(measured by the share of domestic M&A deals in total M&A deals). 
2) Econometric study: through the use of binomial probability tests to find whether 
there is a home bias in M&As; and through appropriate models to test whether 
there are systematic differences in the home bias in M&As between SOEs and 
POEs and between acquirers originating in developed economies and acquirers 
originating in emerging and developing economies. The econometric models 
are presented in section 3.2.2. 
 
 
                                                     
15 This larger deal was the acquisition of Mannesmann AG (from Germany) by Vodafone AirTouch plc 




3.2.1. General patterns on M&A activity – descriptive analysis  
Figure 2 shows that, between 1996 and 2013, the tracked number of M&A deals 
worldwide grew from 5,454 to 11,900, more than doubling in the 18 years’ period – an 
overall growth of 119%, or an average yearly growth16 of 4.4%. The number of domestic 
M&As increased from 4,229 in 1996 to 9,010 in 2013 (4.3% of average yearly growth), 
and the number of cross-border M&As grew faster (with an average yearly growth of 
4.9%), going from 1,225 in 1996 to 2,890 in 2013. 
 





Figure 3 below shows that the total value of the deals also grew in the same period 
– from $1.1 trillion in deals in 1996 to $2.9 trillion in deals in 2013 – an overall growth 
of 169%, or an average yearly growth of 5.6%. Cross-border deals grew much faster than 
domestic M&As with an average yearly growth rate of 8.6% and 4.8% respectively. 
  
                                                     
16 Compound Average Growth Rate (CAGR).  








Both figures 2 and 3 allow noticing a continuous growth in domestic and 
international M&As and cyclical patterns analogous to overall M&As, in yearly number 
of deals and in yearly value of deals. Moreover, it is important to note that the bulk of 
M&A activity still occurs within national borders, i.e. firms seem to have greater 
predisposition to conduct domestic than cross-border deals. In other words, there seems 
to be a home bias in M&A deals17. 
Additionally, it is important to note that the increase in the value of M&As between 
1996 and 2013 (169%) is bigger than the growth in number of M&As (119%). This tell 
us that the average value of a M&A had to increase over the period – indeed the average 
value of a M&A went from $197 million in 1996 to $242 million in 2013. This growth is 
mainly due to the increase in the average value of IM&As (it was $151 million in 1996 
and $281 million in 2013, which represents an overall growth of 86%). The average value 
of domestic M&As also grew over the period, but at a much slower pace (10% of overall 
growth – the average value was $210 million in 1996 and $230 million in 2013). 
  
 It is also important to compare: i) the evolution in worldwide M&A activity with 
the evolution of FDI; ii) the evolution in M&A deals made by SOEs with those made by 
POEs; (iii) and the evolution in M&A deals made by firms originating in developed 
economies with those from emerging and developing economies. 
                                                     
17 This point will be developed in depth later making use of binomial probability tests. 




Figure 4: The evolution in value of worldwide M&As (by all firms: total and cross-
border; by SOEs: total and cross-border; by firms originating in emerging and 




IM&As are a very important component of FDI flows (OECD, 2014; UNCTAD, 
2014). Although the values of IM&As and those of FDI flows cannot be perfectly 
compared, it is important to contrast what happened in the period to these two indicators, 
in order to discern how fast they grew relative to each other. 
Figure 4 above shows that the value of cross-border M&As (IM&As total growth 
equaled 339%, or a yearly annual growth of 8.6%) grew faster than FDI flows (total 
growth 271%, yearly annual growth 7.6%) in the period considered. However, the shape 
of the evolution in the value of cross-border M&As and FDI flows is similar. 
Figure 4 also shows a world of M&A activity chronologically split into two periods, 
one between 1996 and 2007, where privately driven M&As were not growing as fast as 
SOEs’ M&A activity18 but were growing relatively fast; and a more recent period between 
2007 and 2013 where there is a much faster growth in the value of M&As done by SOEs 
than by POEs19, and where M&A activity by POEs had several periods of contraction. 
                                                     
18 Between 1996 and 2007, in terms of total value, M&As by POEs had an overall growth of 391%, while 
M&As by SOEs grew 772% in the same period.  
19 Between 2007-2013, in total value, M&As by SOEs grew 134% while M&As by POEs experienced a 
reduction (-49%). IM&As by POEs decreased (-55%), as well as domestic M&As by POEs (-46%).  




This is true for both domestic and cross-border M&As, and proves the remarkable recent 
dynamism of M&A transactions by SOEs, both in their respective countries and abroad.  
To start with the first period, from 1996 to 2007 overall M&A activity grew 395%, 
driven by, in decreasing order of growth, SOEs’ domestic M&A activity (952%), POEs’ 
IM&A activity (832%), SOEs’ IM&A activity (677%) and by POEs’ domestic M&A 
activity (303%). The second period, since 2007, has seen a dual phenomenon, that is, the 
drop in POEs’ M&A activity and the rapid increase in M&A activity by SOEs. For 
instance, in 2007, the total value of M&As, domestic M&As and IM&As conducted by 
POEs was respectively $5.2, $3.6 and $1.7 trillion. In contrast, in 2013, these amounts 
were reduced to $2.7, $1.9 and $0.7 trillion respectively; almost a 50% cut across the 
board for all types of M&A activity conducted by POEs. Now, looking at M&A activity 
by SOEs we have an opposite story than that for POEs (although we have to keep in mind 
that there is a difference in order of magnitude between the total value of transactions 
conducted by these two types of companies/ acquirers). In 2007, the total value of M&As, 
domestic M&As and IM&As conducted by SOEs was respectively $86.813, $36.093 and 
$50.721 billion. In contrast, in 2013, these amounts had grown to $203.387, $138.070 
and $65.317 billion respectively; a healthy growth pace for all categories and a very 
strong increase for the total value of domestic M&As made by SOEs. 
Thus, while SOEs’ M&A activity has been growing at a fast pace since 1996, its 
relative weight in the context of overall M&As has more than proportionately increased 
since 2007 because of both an acceleration in the total value of deals made by SOEs and 
a simultaneous reduction of the overall value of M&A deals made by POEs.   
 
 A world of M&A activity chronologically split into two periods is also observed 
when the focus is on M&A deals by firms located in emerging and developing economies 
versus those conducted by firms located in developed economies. Between 1996 and 
2007, M&As made by firms originating in developed economies were not growing as fast 
as M&As made by firms originating in emerging and developing economies but were 
growing relatively fast. Between 2007 and 2013 there was a faster growth in the value of 
M&As conducted by firms located in emerging and developing economies than in 
developed economies (where M&A activity had periods of contraction). Indeed, in 2007, 




developed economies was respectively $4.7, $3.2 and $1.5 trillion. In contrast, in 2013, 
these amounts were reduced to $2.2, $1.6 and $0.6 trillion respectively, this representing 
more than a 50% cut across all types of M&A activity. In what concerns M&As made by 
emerging and developing economies, we find evidence that although the pace of growth 
in this period (2007-2013) was much slower than before, overall M&A activity by 
emerging and developing economies continued to grow. In 2007, the total value of 
M&As, domestic M&As and IM&As conducted by firms located in these economies was 
respectively $609.091, $237.878 and $371.213 billion. In 2013, these amounts were 
$634.185 (increased 4%), $168.364 (decreased 29%) and $465.821 billion (increased 
25%) respectively. 
   
Analysis of M&A activity by sector 
Figure 5 shows the sectors in which M&A activity occurred (from the point of view 
of targeted companies).  
Figure 5: Main sectors of the deal's target in all M&A deals in the period 1996-2013 
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Figure 5 shows that in the period 1996-2013, 14% of all M&As had targets in the 
financial sector (14%), followed by telecommunications (12%), computers & electronics 
(8%) and oil & gas, real estate/property, healthcare and utility & energy (all the latter 4 
sectors representing 7% of all M&A activity). 
 
When the focus is on M&A deals by SOEs in the period 1996-2013, as in figure 6, 
there is a very different sectoral distribution. An outstanding percentage of deals targeted 
financial sector firms (45%), followed by oil & gas (10%), utility and energy (10%), 
insurance (6%), telecommunications (5%) and real estate (4%). Considering POE’s deals 
(table 7), we find that, although the percentage is significantly lower when compared with 
SOEs’ M&As, the financial sector is also the sector where more M&As were conducted, 
followed by telecommunications (12%) and computers & electronics (8%). 
 
Figure 6: Main sectors of the deal's target in M&A deals by SOEs in the period 1996-
























Figure 7: Main sectors of the deal’s target in M&A deals by POEs in the period 1996-




Now, looking at the sectoral distribution of M&As made by firms originating in 
developed economies versus those made by firms originating in emerging and developing 
economies (figures 8 and 9 below), we find evidence that in both cases finance and 
telecommunications are sectors where a significant percentage of all M&As were 
conducted (14% and 12% respectively). The main differences between them are the 
following: while firms located in emerging markets and developing economies seem to 
undertake more deals in sectors such as oil & gas (14%), utility and energy (8%) and 
mining (8%), firms originating in developed economies have targeted other sectors, e.g. 
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Figure 8: Main sectors of the deal’s target in M&A deals conducted by firms located in 
developed economies in the period 1996 – 2013 (measured by total value of deals) 
 
 
Figure 9: Main sectors of the deal’s target in M&A deals conducted by firms located in 
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Oil & Gas Finance Telecommunications
Utility & Energy Mining Real Estate/Property
Metal & Steel Construction/Building Chemicals
Transportation Food & Beverage Computers & Electronics
Others
Source: Own elaboration based on Dealogic data. 




Home bias: as worldwide M&A activity increases, do domestic M&As remain the 
dominant area of transactions?   
Home bias – the focus of our study – means the greater propensity to undertake 
domestic than international deals, and is measured by the percentage of domestic M&A 
deals with respect to all M&A deals.  
 




Even though both the number of deals and the total value of deals show some 
decrease in the home bias in M&As, the percentage of domestic deals in total M&A 
transactions is solidly above 70% throughout the period under scrutiny. As shown in the 
figure 10, in 2013, the share of domestic M&As in total M&As was about 75.7% when 
considering the number of deals, and 71.9% when considering the value of deals. As such, 
home bias seems to be a fact, when all investors (SOEs and POEs) are taken together.  
  
 
Home bias in M&As by SOEs vs. POEs 
The following two figures (11 and 12) document the existence and evolution 
(throughout the period considered) of home bias specifically in SOEs and POEs.  
 




Figure 11: SOEs' home bias - % of domestic deals [1996 vs. 2013] 
 
 




Despite the increase in home bias in M&As by SOEs in the period under analysis – 
more so in the value of deals than in terms of number of deals – we find evidence that 
POEs seem to have greater home bias in their M&A activity than SOEs. This is patent in 
the comparison of figures 9 and 10 above. 
Hence, two important observations emerge when we compare figures 9 and 10: 
Source: Own elaboration based on Dealogic data. 




1) Home bias in SOEs seems to be smaller than that of POEs; 
2) Home bias in SOEs has increased, while that of POEs has decreased; 
even so, POEs seems to continue displaying greater home bias. 
 
 
Home bias in M&As by firms located in developed economies vs. emerging and 
developing economies 
 
 According to the figures 13 and 14 below, in 1996, the home bias in M&As 
(measured by the number of domestic M&As in total M&As) was slightly smaller for 
those deals conducted by firms originating in emerging and developing economies than 
for those where the acquirer is located in developed economies. Moreover, the conclusion 
is exactly the same when we consider the deal’s value.  
In 2013, we observe a different world of M&A activity – the home bias in M&As 
seems to be smaller for firms located in developed economies (71,8% of M&As 
conducted by firms located in developing economies were domestic deals, while the 
percentage was 84.8% for firms originating in emerging and developing economies). 
Indeed, if we consider the figures over the period between 1996 and 2013, we find 
evidence that: 
1) Home bias in M&As seems to be smaller for developed economies than for 
emerging and developing economies; 
2)  Home bias in M&As conducted by firms originating in emerging and 
developing economies has increased, while that of developed economies has 






Figure 13: Home bias in M&As by firms originating in developed economies - % of 




Figure 14: Home bias in M&As by firms originating in emerging and developing 






Source: Own elaboration based on Dealogic data. 




3.2.2. Econometric study 
This section starts by explaining the variables selected (dependent and independent) 
and proceeds to the specification of the models used to test econometrically the 
hypotheses formulated throughout this dissertation.  
 
3.2.2.1. Variables 
In order to test the hypotheses stated in section 2, we needed to use a considerable 
array of variables. This section intends to present and explain all the variables that were 
used in the present econometric study.  
 
Dependent variable 
This dissertation aims to investigate whether there is a home bias in M&A deals 
and whether it depends on the type of acquirer and on its home country. Given these aims, 
the dependent variable selected was cross-border (a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
M&A is cross-border and 0 if domestic). The home bias is defined in this dissertation by 
the share of domestic M&A deals in total M&A deals. As cross-border indicates the type 
of M&A activity, this variable allows to find evidence on home bias.  
In the table below, we present the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable. 
 








Type of M&A 
activity 





The literature review presented in chapter 2 allowed to identify possible home bias’ 
drivers which are herein considered as independent/ explanatory variables. 




Below, we present a table with the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
included in the empirical models. 
 

















(+) 206,140 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Investment 
size 
Deal value  
($m) 












(+) 206,140 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Share only 
(dummy) 











(+) 13,492 57,526.1 2,378,016 0 226,000,000 
Acquirer long-
term debt ($m) 





















Treaties of the 
host country 





(+) 206,140 0.005 0.07 0 1 
 
Note: $m means million US dollar; N represents the number of observations; min. indicates the minimum value; and 
max. the maximum value. 
 
As it was clear throughout this dissertation, our key explanatory variables are: i) 
acquirer’s ownership (as we are interested in identifying the effect of ownership control 
on the probability of conducting cross-border M&As, and thus on home bias); and ii) 
acquirer’s country (allowing to test whether the home bias is more predominant in M&As 




undertaken firms located in emerging and developing economies or in developed 
economies)20. The variable used for acquirer’s ownership was SOE, a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the M&A is cross-border, and 0 if domestic. For acquirer’s country, we 
used the variable emerging and developing economy, also a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the acquirer is located in an emerging and developing economy and 0 if it is located 
in a developed economy.    
 In addition to these two variables and in order to study some of the possible 
determinants of home bias in M&As addressed in the literature review, other variables 
were added. First, it was decided to include the investment size and the acquired stake 
through the variables deal value (in $ million) and acquired stake (in percentage), 
respectively.  
Another feature considered in this study is the source of capital for M&A 
financing using the variables cash only (dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A is fully 
funded by cash, and 0 otherwise) and share only (dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
M&A is fully funded by shares, and 0 otherwise). Finally, and also in this context, it was 
decided to take into consideration the variable leveraged buyout (dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the M&A is a leveraged buyout deal, and 0 otherwise). These three variables 
allow to study the impact of financial constraints (insufficient internal funds) on the 
likelihood of conducting cross-border M&As. 
 Additionally, we included two variables to analyze the relationship between the 
acquirer’s size and the likelihood to make IM&As: acquirer total assets ($m) and 
acquirer long-term debt ($m). Moreover, we also consider the acquirer’s business 
efficiency (acquirer gross profit ($m)/ acquirer total assets ($m)). 
 Another characteristic of the acquirer considered in this dissertation is the 
proportion of fixed assets in total assets (acquirer fixed assets ($m)/ acquirer total assets 
($m)) as some studies conclude that firms usually merge to share assets. 
 Finally, we also take into consideration some characteristics of the target’s country 
such as the number of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) (UNCTAD, 2015) and 
whether the target is a tax haven (OECD, 2000)). The first variable (number of bilateral 
investment treaties of the host country) intends to study the impact of the liberalization of 
                                                     
20 Acquirer’s ownership and acquirer’s country are our key independent variables as they allow to test the 
hypotheses 2 and 3 formulated in section 2.3. As it will be explained later, the hypothesis 1 is tested making 




trade and investment regimes and deregulation of services (through BITs) on the home 
bias in M&As; the second variable (target tax haven) is a dummy that equals 1 if the 
target is a tax haven, and 0 otherwise, and allows to find evidence on the propensity of 
firms to conduct M&As in countries known as tax havens.     
  
The correlation matrix of all independent variables is present in appendix 6. We 
can see that there is a strong correlation between acquirer gross profit ($m)/ acquirer 
total assets ($m) and acquirer fixed assets ($m)/ acquirer total assets ($m). Moreover, as 
expected, there is also a strong correlation between acquirer total assets ($m) and 
acquirer debt equity ratio (proxy variables for acquirer’s size) as well as between cash 
only (dummy) and share only (dummy) (proxy variables for source of capital for M&A 
financing). 
 
3.2.2.2. Econometric models 
In this section we specify the models used to test econometrically the hypotheses 
formulated throughout the dissertation: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a home bias in M&A deals. 
Hypothesis 2: SOEs tend to have greater home bias in their M&A activity than 
POEs.  
Hypothesis 3: firms originating in developed economies tend to have a greater 
home bias in their M&A activity than those from emerging and developing economies.  
 
Hypothesis 1 is tested making use of binomial probability tests and hypotheses 2 
and 3 using probit regressions21. All the estimations and binomial probability tests were 
performed recurring to Stata, which is a statistical and econometrical software that strives 
for accuracy and precision on its outputs (as pointed out by Acock, 2012, p. 4). As we are 
estimating the hypotheses through probit models, we run the command probit.  
    
                                                     
21 As the dependent variable is a dummy variable, it was decided to apply probit regressions (Maddala, 




Hypothesis 1 is tested based on binomial probability tests as they allow to establish 
whether or not there is a greater propensity to undertake domestic than international deals, 
i.e. whether the percentage of domestic M&As in total M&As is systematically higher 
than 50%. The variable used to conduct these tests was domestic (it is exactly the opposite 
of the variable cross-border; domestic is a dummy that equals 1 if the M&A is domestic 
and 0 if cross-border). The rationale for these tests is as follows. The null hypothesis (H0) 
states that the percentage of domestic M&As in total M&As is equal to 50%, and the 
alternative hypothesis (HA) posits that the percentage is greater than 50% (Keller, 2005). 
Our main goal is to test whether there is a home bias in M&A activity considering the 
period between 1996 and 2013 as a whole, however we also test the home bias for each 
of the 18 years.  
Binomial probability tests are performed to answer the question whether there is a 
home bias in M&A deals, but an econometric model (probit regression) is also estimated 
in order to find the home bias’ drivers.  
The empirical model (equation 1) is as follows: 
 
Cross-Border = 𝛼+ 𝛽1Investment size + 𝛽2Acquired stake + 𝛽3Source of capital for 
M&A financing + 𝛽4Leveraged buyout + 𝛽5Acquirer’s size + 𝛽6Acquirer’s business 
efficiency + 𝛽7Acquirer’s fixed assets + 𝛽8Investment treaties + 𝜀22                                 (1)                                                                                               
 
To test hypothesis 2, i.e. to test whether SOEs tend to have greater home bias in 
their M&A activity than POEs, we included in the model (equation 2) the variable SOE 
(the variable that allows to know the acquirer’s ownership).  
 
Cross-Border = 𝛼+ 𝛽1Acquirer’s ownership + 𝛽2Investment size + 𝛽3Acquired stake + 
𝛽4Source of capital for M&A financing + 𝛽5Leveraged buyout + 𝛽6Acquirer’s size + 
𝛽7Acquirer’s business efficiency + 𝛽8Acquirer’s fixed assets + 𝛽9Investment treaties + 𝜀                                                                                              
(2) 
 
                                                     
22 As it will be explained later, the variables acquirer’s business efficiency and acquirer’s fixed assets are 
not estimated together as they are highly correlated (see the correlation matrix in appendix 6). The same 




Finally, to test hypothesis 3, i.e. to test whether firms originating in developed 
economies tend to have a greater home bias in their M&A activity than those from 
emerging and developing economies, we added in the model (equation 3) the variable 
emerging and developing economy (below designated as acquirer’s country). In addition, 
we also added the variable target tax haven (dummy) (below designated as tax breaks) in 
order to find whether firms located in tax havens economies (OECD, 2000) are more 
likely to be targeted in IM&A deals than firms located in non-tax haven economies.  
 
Cross-Border = 𝛼+ 𝛽1Acquirer’s country +𝛽2Tax breaks + 𝛽3Investment size + 
𝛽4Acquired stake + 𝛽5Source of capital for M&A financing + 𝛽6Leveraged buyout + 
𝛽7Acquirer’s size + 𝛽8Acquirer’s business efficiency + 𝛽9Acquirer’s fixed assets + 
𝛽10Investment treaties +  𝜀                                                                                              (3) 
 
 
3.3. Empirical results and discussion 
 
In the previous section, we explained how we intend to test the hypotheses 
formulated throughout this dissertation, presenting the equations as well as the 
econometric methodology. In the present section, we provide and analyze the results from 
i) the binomial probability tests; and ii) the estimation of the equations through probit 
regressions.  
3.3.1. Home bias in M&A deals  
As already mentioned, to test hypothesis 1 (that states that there is a home bias in 
M&As) we used binomial probability tests. 
Considering all deals completed between 1996 and 2013, we test whether the 
percentage of domestic M&As in total M&As is greater than 50%. The first part of the 
table below reveals that, assuming a true probability of success of 50%, the expected 
number of successes is 103,070 deals (50% of total deals) and that we observed 151,769. 
Said differently, the assumed frequency under the null hypothesis (H0) is 50%, and the 




In table 4, we present the results of a one-sided test; it is the probability of observing 
151,769 or more successes conditional on p=0.5. It is a test of H0: p=0.5 (the number of 
domestic deals do not differ significantly from the number of cross-border deals) versus 
the alternative hypothesis HA: p>0.5 (more than 50% of all M&A deals are domestic, i.e. 
there is a home bias in M&As). The p-value for this hypothesis test is 0.000, which means 
that we reject the null hypothesis with a confidence level higher than 99%. In other words, 
we find that there is a home bias in M&A activity, confirming hypothesis 1.  
 
Table 4: Hypothesis 1: Binomial probability tests 
Variable N Observed k Expected k Assumed p Observed p 
Domestic 206,140 151,769 103,070 0.50000 0.73624 
Pr (k>=151,769) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
    
Note: N is the number of observations (M&A deals); observed k represents the effective number of domestic M&A 
deals (number of observations for which the variable domestic equals 1); expected k means the number of domestic 
M&A deals under the assumption that the percentage of domestic M&A deals in total M&As equals 50%; assumed p 
is the proportion of domestic M&As in total M&As according to the null hypothesis; and observed p indicates the 
effective percentage of domestic M&A deals in total M&As.   
 
  Additionally, in order to study in depth the existence of home bias in M&As 
between 1996 and 2013, we conducted binomial probability tests for each year as well.  
As shown in table 5 below, the percentage of domestic M&As in total M&As is 
significantly higher than 50% (with a confidence level greater than 99%) for all the years 
under review. In other words, there was always a home bias in M&A activity since 1996 
until 2013.  
This important finding corroborates the results obtained by the few relevant 
empirical studies on home bias in M&As23 (for instance Green, 1990; Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999; di Giovanni, 2005; Lehto, 2006; Berril and Kearney, 2010) and, as 
such, contradicts what financial theory predicts (as referred in section 2.3.1., this is 
designated “home bias puzzle”) (Eldor et al., 1988; De Santis and Gerard, 1997; Cooper 
et al., 2012), and clearly lends support to hypothesis 1.     
 
                                                     
23 As far as we are aware, there are few studies that address explicitly the home bias in M&As. As can be 
seen in section 2.3.1., most of them investigate the determinant factors of cross-border M&As, but do not 
address the home bias issue.  




Table 5: Hypothesis 1: Binomial probability tests by year 
Year N Observed k Expected k Assumed p Observed p 
1996 
5,454 4,229 2,727 0.50000 0.77539 
Pr (k>=4,229) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
1997 
7,529 5,878 3,764.5 0.50000 0.78071 
Pr (k>=5,878) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
1998 
9,449 7,229 4,724.5 0.50000 0.76505 
Pr (k>=7,229) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
1999 
10,299 7,460 5,149.5 0.50000 0.72434 
Pr (k>=7,460) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2000 
12,043 8,668 6,021.5 0.50000 0.71975 
Pr (k>=8,668) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2001 
9,081 6,494 4,540.5 0.50000 0.71512 
Pr (k>=6,494) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2002 
8,359 6,262 4,179.5 0.50000 0.74913 
Pr (k>=6,262) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2003 
8,513 6,569 4,256.5 0.50000 0.77164 
Pr (k>=6,569) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2004 
10,222 7,741 5,111 0.50000 0.75729 
Pr (k>=7,741) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2005 
12,540 9,260 6,270 0.50000 0.73844 
Pr (k>=9,260) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2006 
14,542 10,757 7,271 0.50000 0.73972 
Pr (k>=10,757) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2007 
17,250 12,182 8,625 0.50000 0.70620 
Pr (k>=12,182) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2008 
16,099 11,235 8,049.5 0.50000 0.69787 
Pr (k>=11,235) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2009 
11,983 8,990 5,991.5 0.50000 0.75023 
Pr (k>=8,990) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2010 
13,554 9,792 6,777 0.50000 0.72244 
Pr (k>=9,792) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2011 
13,989 10,023 6,994.5 0.50000 0.71649 
Pr (k>=10,023) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2012 
13,334 9,990 6,667 0.50000 0.74921 
Pr (k>=9,990) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
2013 
11,900 9,010 5,950 0.50000 0.75714 
Pr (k>=9,010) =0.000000 (one-sided test) 
    
Note: N is the number of observations (M&A deals); observed k represents the effective number of domestic M&A 
deals (number of observations for which the variable domestic equals 1); expected k means the number of domestic 
M&A deals under the assumption that the percentage of domestic M&A deals in total M&As equals 50%; assumed p 
is the proportion of domestic M&As in total M&As according to the null hypothesis; and observed p indicates the 
effective percentage of domestic M&A deals in total M&As.   
 
 




 Below, we present eight specifications aiming to establish the factors that influence 
the likelihood of firms conducting cross-border M&As and thus of home bias in M&A 
activity. The first four models do not consider the variable acquirer’s business efficiency 
and the last four do not include the variable acquirer’s fixed assets as these variables are 
highly correlated and for that reason they can be included only separately in the 
estimations (see the correlation matrix in appendix 6). For the same reason, the variables 
cash only (dummy) and share only (dummy) as well as acquirer total assets ($m) and 
acquirer long-term debt are also not included together in the same model. 
  
 Firstly, and before analyzing the results, it is important to note that, while in most 
linear regression models, the coefficient provides indication on the direction (positive or 
negative) of the influence of an independent variable and on the magnitude of that 
influence (the same for all observations and, unless non-linearity of the explanatory 
variables, independent of the variable value), in probit models the coefficient just gives, 
immediately, information on the direction of the influence (Greene, 1997). 
  
 Taking this into account, we can now analyze the econometric results presented in 
table 6. According to models (I) and (II), the coefficient of the variable deal value ($m) 
is negative and statistically significant, which means that, as the value of the M&A 
increases, the likelihood of being cross-border decreases, i.e. IM&A deals tend to be less 
valuable than those conducted within national boundaries. However, in models III, IV, V, 
VI, VIII, the coefficient of the variable is not significant, suggesting that the value of the 
M&A deals does not affect the likelihood of being cross-border. Overall, we can conclude 
that the influence of the deal value on the likelihood of being cross-border is mitigated, 
and, having some influence, it would be negative. This result contradicts that obtained by 
Chen et al. (2009), who found that the value of M&A deals tends to be higher for cross-
border deals than for domestic ones. 
 
 Regarding the variable acquired stake (%), the coefficient obtained is in most cases 
(in models I, II, III, IV and VI) negative and statistically significant. These results suggest 




there is no relevant literature addressing the correlation between the acquired stake and 
the IM&A activity, so this constitutes an important finding. 
  
 Moreover, we found evidence of a significant positive correlation between the 
source of capital for M&A financing and the occurrence of IM&A deals. According to 
the results presented in table 6, we conclude that, ceteris paribus, when a deal is fully 
funded by cash, the likelihood of being cross-border increases, and when is fully funded 
by shares the likelihood of being cross-border decreases. These results are in accordance 
with the findings obtained by Chen et al. (2009) and Rossin and Valpin (2004). Chen et 
al. (2009) concluded that financing constraints (e.g. insufficient internal funds) manifest 
themselves more in IM&As than in domestic M&As; and Rossi and Valpin (2004) found 
a positive correlation between deals fully funded by cash and cross-border deals.  
Additionally, we also study the likelihood of leveraged buyout deals being cross-border. 
All models in table 6 suggest a negative correlation (the coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant), which means that, ceteris paribus, M&As paid using a 
significant amount of borrowed money are less likely to be cross-border. As these results 
indicate that firms with insufficient internal funds face more difficulties in conducting 
IM&As, we can conclude that home bias in M&As is greater for those firms which face 
financing constraints. This finding is also supported by Chen et al. (2009), as mentioned 
above.  
 
 In what concerns the acquirer’s size, the coefficient of both acquirer total assets 
($m) and acquirer long-term debt ($m) variables is positive and statistically significant. 
This result indicates that larger firms have a greater propensity to be involved in cross-
border M&As, i.e. large firms tend to have a less significant home bias in their M&A 
activity than small firms. A similar result was also found by Lehto (2006), who concluded 
that firms with higher turnover tend to undertake more cross-border M&A deals. In turn, 
Chen et al. (2009) as well as Kling and Weitzel (2011) did not find statistically significant 
correlation between the acquirer’s total assets and the IM&A activity.  
 
 In addition, we found that the coefficient of the acquirer’s business efficiency 




suggesting that the acquirer’s business efficiency does not affect the likelihood of 
undertaking IM&As and thus does not influence the home bias in M&As. This result 
compares with that obtained by Kling and Weitzel (2011), who stated that firms with 
higher productivity have increased occurrence of international deals.  
  
 Moreover, we also studied whether firms with a greater proportion of fixed assets 
in total assets tend to conduct more (or less) IM&As and found that there is not a 
significant correlation. As such, this result does not support the idea developed by Lehto 
(2006) that firms usually merge to share assets (in order to increase efficiency and profits). 
To confirm the finding obtained by Lehto (2006), the coefficient would have to be 
negative and statistically significant, meaning that firms with a greater proportion of fixed 
assets in total assets would be reluctant to undertake cross-border M&As and thus would 
face a greater home bias in their M&A activity.   
  
 Finally, according to all models presented in table 6, the coefficient of number of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of the host country is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that firms located in countries with more BITs, ceteris paribus, 
are more likely to be targeted in IM&A deals than firms located in countries with less 
BITs. This is an important finding and supports the conclusions of other studies (for 
instance, Chen and Findlay, 2003; and di Giovanni, 2005), which state that investment 
costs tend to decrease with the liberalization of trade and investment regimes and the 
deregulation of services (through trade/ service agreements). Given this, we conclude that 
bilateral investment treaties tend to decrease the home bias in M&A activity. 
 
    Table 6 summarizes, in a structured way, the results of the estimation of probit 




Table 6: Determinant factors of cross-border M&As: Probit regressions 
Independent variables 
Specifications 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Investment 
size 



















































































































































Acquirer gross profit ($m)/ 
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Investment 
treaties 
Number of bilateral 


























Observations 11,625 9,670 11,625 9,670 8,896 7,369 8,896 7,369 
Qui Square 766.78 667.77 1,159.02 1,027.53 692.02 597.21 1,008.44 878.87 
Source: Own elaboration using Stata. 




3.3.2. Home bias in M&As by SOEs vs. POEs 
 In order to test whether SOEs tend to have greater home bias in their M&A activity 
than POEs, we included in all models the explanatory variable SOE (the variable that 
allows to know the acquirer’s ownership). The results are presented in table 7 below. 
 According to all models estimated, the coefficient of the variable SOE is positive 
and statistically significant, suggesting that, other things being equal, SOEs’ acquirers are 
more likely to undertake cross-border M&A deals than POEs’ acquirers, i.e. SOEs tend 
to have a lower home bias in their M&A activity than POEs. As such, we reject the 
hypothesis 2 (with 99% of confidence level).  
 This important finding contradicts most of the literature studied on M&As that 
addresses the differences (similarities) between SOEs and POEs. This literature argues 
that SOEs tend to have greater home bias in M&As mainly because: i) SOEs are averse 
to transfer abroad (part of) their management control (Chen et al., 2009); ii) SOEs’ deals 
are conducted to restructure the firm and not to acquire strategic foreign assets due to the 
political opposition in the host country (Kling and Weitzel, 2011 and Amighini et al., 
2013); and iii) SOEs are highly dependent on home country institutions (Nutt, 2000 and 
Cui and Jiang, 2012).  
 Although there are several studies that found a greater home bias in M&A activity 
by SOEs, our finding (greater home bias in M&As by POEs) is also in accordance with 
some former studies referenced in the literature review conducted in section 2.3. These 
studies (for instance, Luo and Tung, 2007; Sutherland and Ning, 2011; Duanmu, 2012; 
and Wei et al., 2014) concluded that home bias is lower in M&As by SOEs mainly 
because: i) they possess better access to resources (e.g. through their business affiliates 
or banks); ii) respond to political risks in the host country less negatively; and iii) are 
more likely to invest abroad as a consequence of the appreciation of the home country’s 
currency.     





Table 7: Hypothesis 2: Probit regressions 
Independent variables 
Specifications 














































































Source of capital 
for M&A 
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Acquirer gross profit ($m)/ acquirer 
total assets 















Acquirer fixed assets ($m)/ acquirer 













    
Investment 
treaties 
Number of bilateral investment 

























Qui Square 11,625 9,670 11,625 9,670 8,896 7,369 8,896 7,369 
Observations 795.01 693.32 1,183.32 1,050.49 714.6 618.57 1,029.41 898.4 
Source: Own elaboration using Stata. 





3.3.3. Home bias in M&As by firms located in developed economies vs. 
emerging/ developing economies 
To test whether firms originating in developed economies tend to have a greater 
home bias in their M&A activity than those from emerging and developing economies, 
we included in all models the explanatory variable emerging and developing economy 
(dummy)24. In addition, we also added the variable target tax haven (dummy) in order to 
find whether firms located in tax havens economies (OECD, 2000) are more likely to be 
targeted in IM&A deals than firms located in non-tax haven economies.  
According to both tables 8 and 9, the coefficient of emerging and developing 
economy (dummy) is negative and statistically significant, which means that, ceteris 
paribus, firms originating in emerging and developing economies are less likely to 
undertake IM&A deals, i.e. have a greater home bias in their M&A activity than firms 
originating in developed economies. As such, we reject the hypothesis 3 (with 99% of 
confidence level).  
Although, as far as we aware, there is no relevant literature focused specifically on 
this, the result obtained seems to contradict former studies, for instance Rossi and Volpin, 
2004 and Moskalev, 2010. These studies found that firms located in countries whose real 
GDP per capita is low but its growth is high have become more internationalized through 
IM&As, suggesting that home bias less significant for firms located in emerging and 
developing economies.  
 In what concerns the variable target tax haven, the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant, indicating that, other things being equal, firms located in tax 
haven economies are more likely to be targeted in cross-border M&As than firms located 
in non-tax haven economies. This result supports the findings obtained by Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999), di Giovanni (2005) and Berril and Kearney (2010), suggesting a 
negative correlation between cross-border M&A deals and corporation tax rate in the host 
country.  
 
                                                     
24 In table 8, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan were considered as developed economies and, in table 9, were 




Table 8: Hypothesis 3: Probit regressions (considering Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan as developed economies) 
Independent variables 
Specifications 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Acquirer’s country 
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Acquirer gross profit ($m)/ acquirer 
total assets 















Acquirer fixed assets ($m)/ acquirer 













    
Investment treaties 
Number of bilateral investment 

























Observations 11,625 9,670 11,625 9,670 8,896 7,369 8,896 7,369 
Qui Square 851.7 733.83 1,235.94 1,087.37 765.61 657.45 1,075.28 935.99 
Source: Own elaboration using Stata. 




Table 9: Hypothesis 3: Probit regressions (considering Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan as emerging and developing economies) 
Independent variables 
Specifications 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Acquirer’s country 
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Acquirer gross profit ($m)/ acquirer 
total assets 















Acquirer fixed assets ($m)/ acquirer 













    
Investment treaties 
Number of bilateral investment 

























Observations 11,625 9,670 11,625 9,670 8,896 7,369 8,896 7,369 
Qui Square 823.71 713.09 1,208.79 1,067.53 737.65 637.64 1,049.09 917.98 
Source: Own elaboration using Stata. 




3.4. Data challenges and limitations 
 
Even if after considering other alternatives the Dealogic database was undoubtedly 
the one found to be the most comprehensive and reliable for the objectives of this 
research, some limitations that impact on the analysis persist, and these should be 
acknowledged. 
First of all, to establish whether a company (in this case, an acquirer) is a SOE or a 
POE, the variable “Acquirer Public Status” extracted from Dealogic had to be studied. 
According to Dealogic’s M&A Analytics User Guide25, Acquirer’s Public Status is 
defined as Acquirer’s Ownership Status. SOEs are those companies for which the 
acquirer’s public status is “Government”26, and POEs are the other companies. The issue 
here is that, to be classified government-owned, Dealogic imposes 100% ownership. This 
means that Dealogic considers a very restrictive definition of SOEs, much more 
restrictive than definitions used in previous work by the OECD (OECD, 2013), by 
UNCTAD (UNCTAD, 2014) and by other authors (Sauvant and Strauss, 2012). All this 
prior literature accepts partial state ownership. This restrictive definition of SOEs will 
lead to an underestimation of the number and value of deals made by SOEs that ought to 
be borne in mind. Although we would have preferred to have also information about 
companies that have partial state ownership, this was not possible with this database. Still, 
the number of observations this research encompasses (206,140) gives us a great deal of 
confidence on the robustness of the results, even if they will manifestly underestimate the 
relevance of SOEs in overall M&A activity. 
Two other limitations are also noteworthy. One, the fact that, as in all databases, 
the number of observations is asymmetric across variables. Notably, there are few 
observations for some financial variables. Notwithstanding, we used variables that had a 
number of observations that made us comfortable about the results.  
                                                     
25 Further details about the Dealogic database can be obtained in www.dealogic.com. 
26 The variable “Acquirer Public Status” extracted from the Dealogic database assumes seven categories 
of acquirers: “Consortium”, “Government (Not listed)”, “Joint Venture”, “Private (Not listed)”, “Public 
(listed)”, “Wholly-owned Subsidiary” and “Not applicable”. M&A deals for which “Acquirer Public 
Status” is “Government (Not listed)” were classified as SOEs’ investments and all other M&As were 




Lastly, it is also important to note that there are other factors (in addition to those 
considered in our empirical study) that could possibly justify whether or not there is a 
home bias in M&A deals. Some of these factors are indicated in the next section.  
In all, the Dealogic database suffers from limitations that are akin to all other 
databases; however, to the best of our knowledge, also validated by the OECD, Dealogic 
represented the most rigorous, complete and comprehensive database permitting to unveil 





4. Conclusions and avenues for future research 
 
The ultimate goal of this dissertation was to investigate whether there is a home 
bias in M&As, i.e. whether firms have greater predisposition to undertake domestic than 
cross-border M&A deals. Additionally, two other research questions were also 
formulated: “Is the home bias more predominant in M&As made by SOEs or in M&As 
made by POEs?” and “How does home bias in M&As differ between acquirers originating 
in developed economies and those from emerging and developing economies?”.  
   Firstly, we addressed some of the most important concepts of this dissertation and 
presented the main theories on internationalization through IM&As – industrial 
organizational literature and international business theories (Uppsala model, eclectic 
paradigm, oligopolistic interaction theory, resource-based view and motivations for FDI). 
Subsequently, a literature review on home bias in M&As (mostly empirical) was 
developed, distinguishing SOEs from POEs and firms originating in developing 
economies from those located in emerging and developing economies. Based on the 
literature, on balance, it was expected that (i) there was a home bias in M&As (hypothesis 
1); (ii) SOEs tended to have greater home bias in their M&A activity than POEs 
(hypothesis 2); and (iii) firms originating in developed economies tended to have a greater 
home bias in their M&A activity than those originating in emerging and developing 
economies (hypothesis 3). 
Aiming to answer the formulated research questions (test the hypotheses stated 
above), we developed a quantitative approach, i.e. starting by performing an exploratory 
statistical analysis of the general patterns on M&A activity and subsequently performing 
binomial probability tests and developing an econometric study. The results are clear: 
according to our results, there is a home bias in M&As (it is a fact for every year under 
review and for the period between 1996 and 2013 as a whole). Moreover, contrary to what 
we were expecting, we found a strong evidence that i) SOEs’ acquirers are more likely to 
undertake cross-border M&As than POEs’ acquirers, i.e. SOEs tend to have a lower home 
bias in their M&A activity than POEs; and ii) firms located in emerging and developing 
economies are less likely to conduct cross-border M&As, i.e. they exhibit a greater home 




In addition to the findings stated above, we also found other interesting results such 
as: i) the acquired stake tends to be lower in cross-border M&As (as far as we are aware, 
there is no relevant literature addressing this issue so it constitutes an important finding); 
ii) M&A deals fully funded by cash are more likely to be cross-border deals and M&As 
fully funded by shares are more likely to be domestic deals; iii) leveraged buyout M&As 
are less likely to be cross-border deals; iv) larger firms tend to have a lower home bias in 
their M&A activity; v) firms located in countries with more BITs are more likely to be 
targeted in IM&A deals than firms located in countries with less BITs; and vi) firms 
located in tax haven economies are more likely to be targeted in IM&A deals than firms 
located in non-tax haven economies. 
While this study is an important step towards answering the proposed research 
questions (as indicated throughout this dissertation, as far as we are aware, this kind of 
research focused specifically on home bias in M&As has never been done), there are 
plenty of aspects and opportunities to be addressed by future research. Firstly, it would 
be a major contribution to overcome some of the limitations of the dataset. One of the 
aspects that may be debatable is the use of a narrow, restrictive concept of SOEs 
(motivated by Dealogic’s definition), that considers only entities owned 100% by the 
government. That should be improved, and a broader definition should be adopted. 
Ideally, an excellent initiative that would add considerable value would be to include in 
a new dataset (complemented with data from diverse sources) data about SOEs that are 
partially government-owned. This would be an extremely labor-intensive challenge, but 
would undoubtedly permit a better coverage of the theme under analysis, and an 
exploration of eventual differences between “wholly-owned” and “partially owned” 
government-owned SOEs. 
Lastly, it is also important to note that there are other factors (in addition to those 
considered in our empirical study) that could possibly justify whether or not there is a 
home bias in M&A deals. These factors were not taking into consideration in the analysis 
as they are not covered by Dealogic. The following stand out: geographical and 
asymmetric information aspects, acquirer’s export experience; acquirer’s age; legal 
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Appendix 1 – Countries’ classification (developed economies vs. emerging and 
developing economies) 
As Dealogic does not provide any information on countries’ classification – as 
developed economies vs. emerging and developing economies (a key variable in this 
dissertation) – we had to take into account other sources.  
Firstly, we decided to consider the IMF’s classification27. The latest World 
Economic Outlook report (IMF, 2015) makes use of data from 189 economies, including 
Hong Kong (a Special Administrative Regions in China) and Taiwan (it is neither a 
Special Administrative Region nor a United Nation Member State). The IMF (IMF, 2015) 
classifies 37 of the 189 as developed economies and the remaining 152 as emerging/ 
developing economies.   
Secondly, we used this approach to classify all acquirer’s countries in Dealogic 
database. In Dealogic, the variable that allows knowing the acquirer’s country is 
“Acquirer Nationality”. This variable comprises 182 economies, however 19 were 
reclassified into their respective sovereign state as they are non-sovereign territories 
according to the United Nations28. These 19 economies are: Cook Islands and Tokelau 
(New Zealand); Greenland and Faroe Islands (Denmark); Guadeloupe and New 
Caledonia (France); Turks and Caicos Islands, Anguilla, Isle of Man, Guernsey, Gibraltar, 
Jersey, Cayman Islands, Virgin Islands (British) and Bermuda (United Kingdom); Aruba 
and Netherland Antilles (Netherlands); Virgin Islands (U.S.) and Puerto Rico (United 
States).  
Following that, we noticed that in Dealogic database we had 4 countries not 
considered by the IMF (Andorra, Cuba, Liechtenstein and Monaco), so another source 
was used to categorize them. Andorra, Cuba and Liechtenstein were classified taking into 
account the 2013 Human Development Index (HDI) provided by the United Nations 
(UNSTATS, 2015a); and Monaco was classified considering its HDI in 2009 calculated 
                                                     
27 As stated in section 2.1., the IMF identifies explicitly which economies are developed vs. emerging and 
developing. 




by a United Nations’ project29 as United Nations does not calculate it. Moreover, some 
M&A deals in Dealogic have “Serbia and Montenegro” and “Palestinian territory” as 
“Acquirer Nationality”. Both Serbia and Montenegro are emerging/ developing countries 
according to the IMF (IMF, 2015), so “Serbia and Montenegro” was classified as such as 
well. Palestinian territory30 was classified taking into account the 2013 HDI calculated by 
the United Nations (UNSTATS, 2015a). 
Finally, we categorize Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Hong Kong and Taiwan 
were classified (as developed economies) using the IMF approach (IMF, 2015); and 
Macao was classified (as developed economy as well) taking into consideration the value 
of the HDI in 201131 calculated by the government of Macao (Government of Macao 
Special Administrative Region Statistics and Census Service, 2013)32.   
As these three economies are categorized as developed economies (according to 
the sources mentioned above) and, on the other hand, the United Nations considers them 
as part of an emerging/ developing economy (China), we decided to conduct estimations 
for both cases, i.e. considering them as developed economies (see table 8 in section 3.3.3.) 
and as emerging and developing economies (see table 9 in section 3.3.3.). In section 3.2.1. 
(General patterns on M&A activity – descriptive analysis), we adopted the first approach, 
i.e. we considered Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao as developed economies.    
 In appendix 2, we present the list of economies considered by the IMF and its 
classification and, in appendix 3, the list of economies considered by Dealogic and its 







                                                     
29 http://www.self.gutenberg.org/articles/Industrialized_nations#cite_note-UN_Escap-14, accessed on 
September 2nd, 2015. 
30 Palestine is not a United Nations Member State as it is a region that comprises primarily Israel, the West 
Bank, the Gaza Strip and small parts of Jordan. 
31 There was no later update. 
32http://www.dsec.gov.mo/getAttachment/1310df1c-dce8-4ff6-ba83-





Appendix 2 – List of economies considered by the IMF and its classification (IMF, 
2015) 
 




1 Australia 14 Iceland 27 Portugal 
2 Austria 15 Ireland 28 San Marino 
3 Belgium 16 Israel 29 Singapore 
4 Canada 17 Italy 30 Slovak Republic 
5 Cyprus 18 Japan 31 Slovenia 
6 Czech Republic 19 Korea 32 Spain 
7 Denmark 20 Latvia 33 Sweden 
8 Estonia 21 Lithuania 34 Switzerland 
9 Finland 22 Luxembourg 35 Taiwan Province of China 
10 France 23 Malta 36 United Kingdom 
11 Germany 24 Netherlands 37 United States 
12 Greece 25 New Zealand   
13 Hong Kong SAR 26 Norway   
Emerging and developing economies 
1 Afghanistan 52 Ghana 103 Panama 
2 Albania 53 Grenada 104 Papua New Guinea 
3 Algeria 54 Guatemala 105 Paraguay 
4 Angola 55 Guinea 106 Peru 
5 Antigua and Barbuda 56 Guinea-Bissau 107 Philippines 
6 Argentina 57 Guyana 108 Poland 
7 Armenia 58 Haiti 109 Qatar 
8 Azerbaijan 59 Honduras 110 Romania 
9 The Bahamas 60 Hungary 111 Russia 
10 Bahrain 61 India 112 Rwanda 
11 Bangladesh 62 Indonesia 113 Samoa 
12 Barbados 63 Islamic Republic of 
Iran 
114 São Tomé and Príncipe 
13 Belarus 64 Iraq 115 Saudi Arabia 
14 Belize 65 Jamaica 116 Senegal 
15 Benin 66 Jordan 117 Serbia 
16 Bhutan 67 Kazakhstan 118 Seychelles 
17 Bolivia 68 Kenya 119 Sierra Leone 
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina 69 Kiribati 120 Solomon Islands 
19 Botswana 70 Kosovo 121 South Africa 
20 Brazil 71 Kuwait 122 South Sudan 
21 Brunei Darussalam 72 Kyrgyz Republic 123 Sri Lanka 





Source: Own elaboration based on IMF (2015). 
 
Appendix 3 – List of economies considered tax havens  
 
Emerging and developing economies 
23 Burkina Faso 74 Lebanon 125 St. Lucia 
24 Burundi 75 Lesotho 126 St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
25 Cabo Verde 76 Liberia 127 Sudan 
26 Cambodia 77 Libya 128 Suriname 
27 Cameroon 78 FYR Macedonia 129 Swaziland 
28 Central African Republic 79 Madagascar 130 Syria 
29 Chad 80 Malawi 131 Tajikistan 
30 Chile 81 Malaysia 132 Tanzania 
31 China 82 Maldives 133 Thailand 
32 Colombia 83 Mali 134 Timor-Leste 
33 Comoros 84 Marshall Islands 135 Togo 
34 Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
85 Mauritania 136 Tonga 
35 Republic of Congo 86 Mauritius 137 Trinidad and Tobago 
36 Costa Rica 87 Mexico 138 Tunisia 
37 Côte d'Ivoire 88 Micronesia 139 Turkey 
38 Croatia 89 Moldova 140 Turkmenistan 
39 Djibouti 90 Mongolia 141 Tuvalu 
40 Dominica 91 Montenegro 142 Uganda 
41 Dominican Republic 92 Morocco 143 Ukraine 
42 Ecuador 93 Mozambique 144 United Arab Emirates 
43 Egypt 94 Myanmar 145 Uruguay 
44 El Salvador 95 Namibia 146 Uzbekistan 
45 Equatorial Guinea 96 Nepal 147 Vanuatu 
46 Eritrea 97 Nicaragua 148 Venezuela 
47 Ethiopia 98 Niger 149 Vietnam 
48 Fiji 99 Nigeria 150 Yemen 
49 Gabon 100 Oman 151 Zambia 
50 The Gambia 101 Pakistan 152 Zimbabwe 
51 Georgia 102 Palau   
Tax Havens 
1 Andorra 15 Grenada 29 Panama 
2 Anguilla 16 Guernsey 30 Samoa 
3 Antigua and Barbuda 17 Isle of Man 31 San Marino 
4 Aruba 18 Jersey 32 Seychelles 
5 Bahamas 19 Liberia 33 St. Lucia 





Source: Own elaboration based on OECD (2000). 
 
Appendix 4 – Number of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) by economy  
Number of BITs 
Afghanistan 3 Ghana 26 Northern Mariana Islands 0 
Albania 43 Gibraltar 0 Norway 15 
Algeria 47 Greece 43 Occupied Palestinian 
territory 
3 
Andorra 0 Greenland 0 Oman 35 
Angola 8 Grenada 2 Pakistan 46 
Anguilla 0 Guadeloupe 0 Palau 0 
Antigua and Barbuda 2 Guam 0 Panama 24 
Argentina 58 Guatemala 20 Papua New Guinea 6 
Armenia 42 Guinea 20 Paraguay 24 
Aruba 0 Guinea-Bissau 2 Peru 29 
Australia 21 Guyana 8 Philippines 37 
Austria 62 Haiti 7 Pitcairn 0 
Azerbaijan 47 Holy See 0 Poland 62 
Bahamas 1 Honduras 11 Portugal 55 
Bahrain 29 Hong Kong, China 
SAR 
17 Puerto Rico 0 
Bangladesh 29 Hungary 58 Qatar 51 
Barbados 10 Iceland 9 Réunion 0 
Belarus 60 India 84 Romania 82 
Belgium 93 Indonesia 64 Russian Federation 73 
Belize 7 Iran, Islamic Republic 
of 
61 Rwanda 7 
Benin 16 Iraq 7 Saint Helena 0 
Bermuda 0 Ireland 0 Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 
Bhutan 0 Isle of Man 0 Saint Lucia 2 
Bolivia, Plurinational 
State of 
16 Israel 38 Saint Pierre and Miquelon 0 
      
 Tax Havens 
7 Bermuda 21 Malta 35 St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
8 Belize 22 Marshall Islands 36 Turks & Caicos Islands 
9 Virgin Islands (British) 23 Mauritius 37 Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
10 Cayman Islands 24 Monaco 38 Vanuatu 
11 Cook Islands 25 Montserrat 39 Barbados 
12 Cyprus 26 Nauru 40 Maldives 
13 Dominica 27 Netherlands Antilles 41 Tonga 




Number of BITs 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 39 Italy 91 Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
2 
Botswana 9 Jamaica 17 Samoa 0 
Brazil 14 Japan 26 San Marino 9 
British Virgin Islands 0 Jordan 54 Sao Tome and Principe 1 
Brunei Darussalam 8 Kazakhstan 47 Saudi Arabia 24 
Bulgaria 68 Kenya 14 Senegal 27 
Burkina Faso 16 Kiribati 0 Serbia 52 
Burundi 7 Korea, Dem. People's 
Rep. of 
24 Seychelles 4 
Cambodia 21 Korea, Republic of 90 Sierra Leone 3 
Cameroon 17 Kuwait 75 Singapore 44 
Canada 40 Kyrgyzstan 30 Slovakia 55 
Cape Verde 8 Lao People's 
Democratic Republic 
24 Slovenia 37 
Cayman Islands 0 Latvia 44 Solomon Islands 0 
Central African Republic 4 Lebanon 50 Somalia 2 
Chad 14 Lesotho 3 South Africa 40 
Channel Islands 0 Liberia 4 South Sudan 0 
Chile 50 Libya 36 Spain 82 
China 130 Liechtenstein 0 Sri Lanka 28 
Christmas Island 0 Lithuania 54 Sudan 28 
Cocos (Keeling) Islands 0 Luxembourg 93 Suriname 3 
Colombia 14 Macao, China SAR 2 Swaziland 6 
Comoros 6 Macedonia, The former 
Yugoslav Republic of 
39 Sweden 69 
Congo 14 Madagascar 9 Switzerland 118 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the 
16 Malawi 6 Syrian Arab Republic 42 
Cook Islands 0 Malaysia 69 Taiwan Province of China 23 
Costa Rica 21 Maldives 0 Tajikistan 34 
Côte d'Ivoire 12 Mali 18 Tanzania, United Republic 
of 
19 
Croatia 57 Malta 22 Thailand 39 
Cuba 59 Marshall Islands 1 Timor-Leste 3 
Curaçao 0 Martinique 0 Togo 4 
Cyprus 28 Mauritania 20 Tokelau 0 
Czech Republic 79 Mauritius 41 Tonga 1 
Denmark 55 Mayotte 0 Trinidad and Tobago 13 
Djibouti 9 Mexico 29 Tunisia 54 
Dominica 2 Micronesia, Federated 
States of 
0 Turkey 89 
Dominican Republic 14 Moldova, Republic of 41 Turkmenistan 25 
Ecuador 18 Monaco 0 Turks and Caicos Islands 0 




Number of BITs  
El Salvador 22 Montenegro 20 Uganda 15 
Equatorial Guinea 9 Montserrat 0 Ukraine 74 
Eritrea 4 Morocco 63 United Arab Emirates 46 
Estonia 27 Mozambique 25 United Kingdom 104 
Ethiopia 29 Myanmar 8 United States of America 46 
Faeroe Islands 0 Namibia 14 United States Virgin Islands 0 
Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas) 
0 Nauru 0 Uruguay 31 
Fiji 0 Nepal 6 Uzbekistan 50 
Finland 72 Netherlands 96 Vanuatu 2 
France 104 New Caledonia 0 Venezuela, Bolivarian 
Republic of 
28 
French Guiana 0 New Zealand 4 Viet Nam 60 
French Polynesia 0 Nicaragua 17 Wallis and Futuna Islands 0 
Gabon 14 Niger 5 Yemen 37 
Gambia 16 Nigeria 25 Zambia 11 
Georgia 32 Niue 0 Zimbabwe 30 
Germany 134 Norfolk Island 0   
 
Source: Own elaboration based on UNCTAD (2015). 
 
Appendix 5 – List of acquirer’s countries and its classification – Dealogic database 
Developed economies  
1 Australia 15 Ireland 29 Slovenia 
2 Austria 16 Israel 30 South Korea 
3 Belgium 17 Italy 31 Spain 
4 Canada 18 Japan 32 Sweden 
5 Cyprus 19 Latvia 33 Switzerland 
6 Czech Republic 20 Lithuania 34 Taiwan 
7 Denmark 21 Luxembourg 35 United Kingdom 
8 Estonia 22 Malta 36 United States 
9 Finland 23 Netherlands 37 Andorra 
10 France 24 New Zealand 38 Cuba 
11 Germany 25 Norway 39 Liechtenstein 
12 Greece 26 Portugal 40 Macao 
13 Hong Kong 27 Singapore 41 Monaco 
14 Iceland 28 Slovak Republic   
 
Source: Own elaboration (see appendix 1). 
Note: In the econometric study we make two approaches: considering Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan as developed 







Emerging and developing economies 
1 Albania 42 Guatemala 83 Paraguay 
2 Algeria 43 Guyana 84 Peru 
3 Angola 44 Haiti 85 Philippines 
4 Antigua and Barbuda 45 Honduras 86 Poland 
5 Argentina 46 Hungary 87 Qatar 
6 Armenia 47 India 88 Romania 
7 Azerbaijan 48 Indonesia 89 Russian Federation 
8 Bahamas 49 Iran 90 Rwanda 
9 Bahrain 50 Iraq 91 Saint Lucia 
10 Bangladesh 51 Jamaica 92 Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadin 
11 Barbados 52 Jordan 93 Samoa 
12 Belarus 53 Kazakhstan 94 Saudi Arabia 
13 Belize 54 Kenya 95 Senegal 
14 Benin 55 Kuwait 96 Serbia 
15 Bolivia 56 Kyrgyzstan 97 Serbia and Montenegro 
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina 57 Lebanon 98 Seychelles 
17 Botswana 58 Liberia 99 Sierra Leone 
18 Brazil 59 Libya 100 South Africa 
19 Brunei Darussalam 60 Macedonia 101 Sri Lanka 
20 Bulgaria 61 Madagascar 102 Sudan 
21 Cambodia 62 Malawi 103 Swaziland 
22 Cameroon 63 Malaysia 104 Syria 
23 Chile 64 Mali 105 Tajikistan 
24 China 65 Mauritania 106 Tanzania 
25 Colombia 66 Mauritius 107 Thailand 
26 Congo 67 Mexico 108 Togo 
27 Congo, Democratic 
Republic of 
68 Moldova 109 Trinidad and Tobago 
28 Costa Rica 69 Mongolia 110 Tunisia 
29 Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 70 Montenegro 111 Turkey 
30 Croatia 71 Morocco 112 Uganda 
31 Dominican Republic 72 Mozambique 113 Ukraine 
32 Ecuador 73 Myanmar 114 United Arab Emirates 
33 Egypt 74 Namibia 115 Uruguay 
34 El Salvador 75 Nepal 116 Uzbekistan 
35 Equatorial Guinea 76 Nicaragua 117 Venezuela 
36 Eritrea 77 Niger 118 Vietnam 
37 Ethiopia 78 Nigeria 119 Yemen 
38 Fiji 79 Oman 120 Zambia 
39 Gabon 80 Pakistan 121 Zimbabwe 
40 Georgia 81 Panama 122 Palestinian Territories 
41 Ghana 82 Papua New Guinea   
 






















































Deal value ($m) 1             
Acquired stake (%) 0.097 1            
Acquirer total assets 
($m) 
0.078 -0.1505 1           
Acquirer long-term 
debt ($m) 
0.0595 -0.133 0.744 1          
Acquirer gross profit 
($m)/ acquirer total 
assets ($m) 
-0.0024 -0.0184 -0.0056 -0.0029 1         
Acquirer fixed assets 
($m)/ acquirer total 
assets ($m) 
-0.0028 -0.0223 -0.0059 -0.003 0.9302 1        
Cash only (dummy) -0.0851 -0.2887 0.0993 0.0968 -0.0111 -0.0061 1       
Share only (dummy) 0.0905 0.2217 -0.0611 -0.0595 -0.009 -0.0103 -0.6159 1      
Leveraged buyout 
(dummy) 
-0.0072 0.0156 0.0026 -0.0044 -0.0013 -0.0013 0.0045 -0.0216 1     
Number of bilateral 
investment treaties by 
target country 
0.0519 0.1036 0.0482 0.0557 -0.0103 -0.012 0.0172 -0.1309 -0.0231 1    
SOE 0.0017 -0.0104 -0.0095 -0.0034 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0032 -0.016 -0.0043 0.0093 1   
Developed economy 
(dummy) 
-0.0208 -0.0589 -0.0434 -0.0504 -0.0044 -0.0041 -0.0526 0.0155 -0.0196 0.081 -0.0094 1  
Target tax haven 
(dummy) 
-0.0038 0.0048 0.0158 0.001 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0021 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0461 -0.0022 0.0196 1 
 
Source: Own elaboration using Stata.  
